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THE ROLE OF NATURAL LAW IN EARLY
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: DID
THE FOUNDERS CONTEMPLATE
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF
"UNWRITTEN" INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS?
HELEN

K.

MICHAEL*

The debate over whetherjudges should enforce fundamental individual rights not enumerated in the Constitution has been intense in
recent years. Supporters of the theory of majoritariandemocracy contend thatjudges must adhereto the originalintentfound in the Consti-

tution. In contrast, those favoring libertarianprinciples o.f respecting
fundamental human rights chargejudges with the duty of reading into
the Constitution unenumerated rights in order to protect individual
liberties.
In this Article, Helen K. Michael delves into this debate by taking
to task a recent articleby Suzanna Sherry which contends that thefounders intendedfor courts to look outside the Constitution to enforce unwritten natural rights. Michael examines the natural law traditions
embraced by the colonists; early state constitutions and case law; and
records of state-ratifying conventions. From this historical record, she
concludes that it is unclearwhether thefounders intendedjudges to void
legislation toprotect rightsexpressly enumerated in the Constitutionand
that thefounders did not intendjudges to void legislation based on unwritten naturallaw. At the same time, the author leaves open the question whether the intent of the founders should control contemporary
interpretationof the Constitution.
INTRODUCTION

As the United States prepared to celebrate the bicentennial of its Constitution, former Judge Robert F. Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court embroiled the Senate in the debate that has long raged in academic circles: whether
judges should play any role in enforcing fundamental individual rights not enumerated in the Constitution.I The radically different roles that participants
* Attorney, Howrey & Simon, Washington, D.C.; Member, Maryland and District of Columbia Bars; LL.M., 1989, George Washington University; J.D., 1986, University of North Carolina;
B.A., 1981, Hampshire College. I am indebted to Arthur Wilmarth for his insightful comments on
earlier drafts of this Article and to Renata J. Mueller for her editorial and secretarial assistance.
1. For the Senate Judiciary Committee's report about the confirmation hearings, see SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, NOMINATION OF ROBERT H. BORK TO BE AN ASSOCIATE JUsTICE OF

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT,
after BORK DEBATES].

S. ExEC. REP. No. 7, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987) [herein-

For a sampling of the ongoing scholarly debate about the proper scope of judicial review, see
generally R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-
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ascribed to judges during the Senate's confirmation hearings illustrate the contemporary importance of, and the profound difficulty in reconciling, two principles that are deeply embedded in American constitutional theory. On the one
hand is the principle of majoritarian democracy prohibiting the government
from imposing laws on the people without their consent and accordingly awarding law-making power only to electorally accountable individuals. 2 On the other
hand is the libertarian principle assigning to all individuals certain rights identified by Thomas Jefferson's Declaration of Independence as "inalienable," '3 and
bestowed upon us, as John Dickinson wrote, not from men's "parchments and
'4
seals" but from God's "eternal maxims of justice and reason."
Invoking the principle of majoritarian democracy, Judge Bork espoused the
interpretivist theory of judicial review. This theory limits judges, who are
neither popularly elected nor directly accountable to the electorate, to constitutional interpretation that adheres to the "original intent" of the people who
made the Constitution the law. In his opening statement to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, for example, Judge Bork asserted:
The judge's authority derives entirely from the fact that he is applying
the law and not his own personal values ....How should a judge go
about finding the law? The only legitimate way is by attempting to
discern what those who made the law intended. The intentions of the
lawmakers govern, whether the lawmakers are the Congress of the
United States enacting a statute or those who ratified our Constitution
and its various amendments. 5
In Judge Bork's view, adhering to the people's original intent dictates that "[tihe
Constitution speciffy] certain liberties" that judges are authorized to protect and
allocates the creation of new rights "to democratic processes." 6 Thus, Judge
Bork insists that courts "invad[e] the proper domain of democratic government"
when they legislate judicially under the guise of protecting unenumerated consti7
tutional rights.
Conversely, Senator Biden espoused the libertarian principle of respecting
TEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL RE-

VIEW (1980); Berns, Taking Rights Frivolously, in LIBERALISM RECONSIDERED 51 (D. Maclean &
C. Mills eds. 1983); Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1
(1971); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,60 B.U.L. REv. 204 (1980);
Bridwell, The Scope ofJudicialReview: A Dirgefor the Theorists ofMajority Rule?, 31 S.C.L. REV.
617 (1980); Perry, Interpretivism, Freedom of Expression, andEqualProtection,42 OHIO ST. L.J. 261
(1981); Symposium on Interpreting the Ninth 4mendment, 64 CHI.[-JKENT L. REV. 35 (1988).
2. See G. WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 162-63 (1969).
3. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). For further discussion of the Declaration, see infra text accompanying notes 131-32.
4. G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 293 (quoting Address by John Dickinson to the Committee of
Correspondence in Barbados (1766)); cf Hamilton, A FarmerRefuted & C (1770), quoted in G.
WOOD, supra note 2, at 293 ("The sacred rights of mankind" are "not to be rummaged for, among
old parchments, or musty records.").
5. BORK DEBATES, supra note 1, at 9 (emphasis added); see Bork, The Constitution, Original
Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 829 (1986).
6. BORK DEBATES, supra note 1, at 11.
7. Id. at 30.
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fundamental human rights. Recalling the views expressed by Jefferson and
Dickinson more than 200 years ago, the Senator contended:
I believe all Americans are born with certain inalienable rights. As a
child of God, I believe my rights are not derivedfrom the Constitution.
My rights are not derivedfrom any government. My rights are not derived from any majority. My rights are because I exist. They were
given to me and each of my fellow citizens
by our Creator, and they
8
represent the essence of human dignity.
Relying upon this principle, Senator Biden defended the noninterpretivist theory
of judicial review, maintaining that judges in each generation possess the special
duty of "enhancing" unenumerated rights intrinsic to human dignity and of
"reading more firmly into the Constitution protection" of such rights. 9 The Senator consequently viewed Judge Bork as shirking judicial responsibility in refusing to enforce such rights, and asserted that the judge had placed himself
squarely "on the side of government intrusion . . . and against expansion of
individual rights." 10
In a recent article,11 Suzanna Sherry attempts to resolve the seemingly irresolvable conflict between the interpretivist and noninterpretivist theories of judicial review. Sherry adopts the interpretivists' inquiry regarding the question of
12
how "the founding generation [understood] the Constitution they created,"
but then provides an answer to this question that stands traditional interpretivist
theory on its head. Sherry contends that, based upon the natural-law tradition
inherited by the American colonists, the founding generation believed that
"their new Constitution [would not] be the sole source of paramount or higher
law." 13 Specifically, she asserts that they expected "courts to look outside the
Constitution in determining the validity of ... governmental actions... affecting the fundamental rights of individuals." 14 Sherry thus suggests that the principle of majoritarian democracy, which the interpretivists assert confines judges
to enforcing only enumerated constitutional rights, actually is consistent with
noninterpretivist review of legislation. Her thesis is that the founding generation
expected judges to consult unwritten natural law to enforce fundamental rights
not enumerated in the Constitution. In this Article, I will raise anew the question Sherry has posed, with the caveat that I advocate no position concerning
whether the founding generation's understanding should control contemporary
constitutional interpretation. 15 Specifically, I ask whether the natural-law tradi8. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 34.

10. Id.
II. Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. RFv. 1127 (1987).
12. Id. at 1127.

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. I personally support the results the Supreme Court reached in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), limited by City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989), and its progeny including
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, limited by Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040
(1989). In fact, my objective when I began this research project was to find historical support for the
practice of noninterpretivist judicial review and to write an article defending this practice. I found,
however, that support for the practice simply cannot be grounded in constitutional history.
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tion inherited by the founding generation led them to expect judges to void legislation to protect unwritten individual rights. Part I examines the natural-law
traditions that informed the American colonists' thought, while revisiting many

of the historical sources upon which Sherry relies, as well as others on which she

does not. To determine how states employed these natural law traditions, Part
II then examines the states' first attempts at constitution-making and the judiciary's interpretation of the early state constitutions. Finally, Part III reviews the
records of the debates entertained in the state ratifying conventions that ultimately made the new Constitution binding law. Contrary to Sherry, I conclude
that the historical record indicates that the founders did not even uniformly
expect judges to engage in interpretivist review of legislation based upon express
constitutional terms, much less to void legislation based upon unwritten law.
DISCUSSION

L

Inherited NaturalLaw Traditions

To support her thesis, Sherry first looks to the natural law traditions that
the American colonists embraced as a justification for revolution. She observes
that the American colonists borrowed eclectically from a diverse body of
thought, including the theories of John Locke, Sir Edward Coke, and the
"Country Party" opposition thinkers, and various continental enlightenment
thinkers, but she primarily focuses on Coke as exemplifying the spirit of English
constitutionalism. 16 She synthesizes the following three principles from Coke's
theory: 1) That the British Constitution embodied "some form of higher law"
and rendered "void Acts of Parliament inconsistent with that fundamental law";
16. See Sherry, supra note 11, at 1128-30. Sherry also discusses Henry St. John Viscount Bolingbroke's and Thomas Rutherford's theories, see id.at 1129-30, but she relies upon Coke to support
her thesis concerning judicial review. For further discussion of Bolingbroke, see infra note 88 and
accompanying text.
J.G.A. Pocock first suggested that the intellectual history of English opposition thought can
best be understood as a conflict between "Court" and "Country" ideology. Eg., Pocock,
Machiavell Harrington, and English Political Ideologies in the Eighteenth Century, 22 WM. &

MARY Q.549, 552 (1965). Pocock offers the following summary of Country ideology:

Society is made up of court and country; government, of court and Parliament; Parliament,
of court and country members. The court is the administration. The country consists of
the men of independent property; all others are servants. The business of Parliament is to
preserve the independence of property, on which is founded all human liberty and all
human excellence. The business of the administration is to govern, and this is a legitimate
activity; but to govern is to wield power, and power has a natural tendency to encroach. It
is more important to supervise government than to support it, because the preservation of
independence is the ultimate political good. There exists an ancient constitution in England, which consists in a balance or equilibrium between the various organs of government,
and within this balance the function of Parliament is to supervise the executive. But the
executive possesses means of distracting Parliament from its proper function; it seduces
members by the offer of places and pensions, by retaining them to follow ministers and
ministers' rivals, by persuading them to support measures-standing armies, national
debts, excise schemes-whereby the activities of administration grow beyond Parliament's
control. These means of subversion are known collectively as corruption .... The remedy
for corruption is to expel placemen, to insure that members of Parliament become in no
way entangled in the pursuit of power or the exercise of administration, and to see to it that
parliaments are frequently elected by uncorrupted voters.
Id. at 565-66.
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2) that constitutional fundamental law "consisted of a mixture of custom, natural law, religious law, enacted law, and reason"; and 3) that judges might use
this law "to pronounce void inconsistent legislative or royal enactments." 17 She

contends that these three principles, in turn, provided the conceptual framework
for noninterpretivist judicial review and enabled state courts in the first years of
the Republic to pass "on the validity of legislative enactments in light of some
higher law." 18
A. Cokean Theory
It is unlikely that Coke was articulating the American doctrine of judicial
review, which mandates that judicial determinations of unconstitutionality are
binding upon the executive and legislative branches of government, in issuing his
famous dicta in Dr. Bonham's Case.19 In this dicta, Coke asserted that "when
an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such
Act to be void."' 20 At another point, however, Coke contradictorily asserted
that "the power and jurisdiction of the Parliament ...is so transcendent and
absolute... [that] it cannot be confined either for causes or persons within any
21
bounds."
Seventeenth-century English political theory itself produced the paradox
seemingly inherent in Coke's acceptance of both the limited and absolute versions of parliamentary power. Seventeenth-century Englishmen had no concept
of formally separating the powers of the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of government as a mechanism to limit the government's power. Instead, they relied upon combining the monarchy, the Lords, and the Commons
within a single institution ("the Crown in Parliament") so that each component
of government could act as a check on the others. 22 Under this theory of mixed
government, the House of Lords, then and today, serves both as a legislative
organ and the highest judicial court. When one focuses on the House of Lords'
role as the English court of last resort, the apparent paradox evident in Coke's
position seems to resolve itself: when Coke asserted that the principles of "common right and reason" could "control" acts of Parliament, he apparently was
23
referring to the House of Lords' power as a court to enforce those principles.
17. Sherry, supra note 11, at 1129.
18. Id. at 1134-35.
19. Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B. 1610), quoted in Grey, Origins ofthe Unwritten
Constitution in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv.843, 862 (1978).
20. Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652. when Coke spoke of common right and reason
he was alluding to the principles embodied in divine or natural law. See Cordn, The "HigherLaw"
Background ofAmerican ConstitutionalLaw (pts. 1-2), 42 HARv. L. REv. 149, 365, 370 (1928).
21. 4 COKE INSTrrUTEs 39 (1644), quoted in Smith, Dr. Bonham's Case andthe Modern Significance of Lord Coke's Influence, 41 WASH. L. REV.297, 310 (1955).
22. See F. McDoNALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM 81 (1985); G. WOOD, supranote 2, at 18-19.
The Frenchman, Charles Montesquieu, introduced Americans to the doctrine of separation of powers in expounding his idealized version of the English Constitution. See 1 C. MONTESQUIEU, THE
SPIRIT OF LAWS 8-18, 202-04 (T". Nugent trans. 1949). For further discussion of Montesquieu's
theory, see infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
23. See, eg., A. MCLAUGHLIN, THE COURTS, THE CONSTIrUION, AND PARTIES 139-43
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Given Coke's endorsement of Parliamentary supremacy, however, it is highly
unlikely that he was asserting that the Parliament would be bound by the deter24
mination of a lower king's court that a statute was unconstitutional.

While Coke probably did not envision ordinary courts as possessing the
final authority to resolve constitutional controversies, the literal terms of his

dicta in Dr. Bonham's Case nonetheless could justify the American practice of
judicial review. Coke's dicta appeared to authorize the House of Lords in its
judicial capacity to invalidate statutes that Parliament enacted in its legislative

capacity.2 5 In the United States, which chose not to create an institution like

the House of Lords, that House's power to invalidate legislation logically could
fall to the ordinary courts.

Coke's theory about the relationship between natural law and jurisprudence
also could provide grounds for awarding ordinary courts the power to review

legislation. For Coke, natural law was an intellectual discipline belonging to
"the peculiar science of judges."'2 6 He asserted that judges, "schooled in the

artificial reason and judgment of the law,"' 2 7 are uniquely qualified to interpret
and apply the law of nature, which "God at the time of creation of the nature of
man infused into his heart."'28 He also asserted that judges were uniquely qualified to interpret and apply the law of reason through which Coke believed God
(1912); Corwin, supra note 20, at 373-75; cf. Thorne, The Constitution and the Courts: A Reexamination of the Famous Case ofDr.Bonham, in THE CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERED 15 (C. Read rev.
ed. 1968) (arguing that Coke was only articulating a rule of statutory construction through which
courts could avoid reaching inequitable results).
24. Cf. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution in American Revolutionary Thought, 30
STAN. L. REV. 843, 856 (1978) (contending that "[tihe doctrine of Marbury v. Madison, which
asserts the final authority of ordinary courts on constitutional questions, probably was not suggested
by Dr. Bonham's Case").
Lord Coke's theory of judicial review was not well received in England and eventually led to
Coke's removal from the bench. See C.G. HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY 222-23 (1932). By Blackstone's time, the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy had
become the prevailing force in English constitutional theory. Blackstone wrote that Parliament pos.
sesses the "supreme and absolute authority of the state," 1 W. BLACmSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 147,
which is the "sovereign and uncontrollable authority in the making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving and expounding of laws." Id. at *160. Even Blackstone,
however, gave Cokean theory a specious bow, stating that "the law of nature... is of course superior
in obligation to any other," and that "[n]o human laws are of any validity if contrary to this." Id. at
*40.
25. See Grey, supra note 24, at 856.
26. Corwin, supra note 20, at 370.
27. Prohibitions del Roy, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343 (K.B. 1608), quoted in Berger, "Original

Intention" in HistoricalPerspective, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REv.296,

306 (1986).

28. Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 392 (K.B. 1609), quoted in Corwin, supra note 20, at 369.
In fact, Coke dared to lecture King James I on this point. In Prohibitionsdel Roy, Coke asserted that the King should not interpret the law because he was not professionally trained as a
lawyer and that he could not "adjudge any case, either criminal ... or betwixt party and party." 77
Eng. Rep. at 1342, quoted in Berger, "OriginalIntention" in HistoricalPerspective, 54 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 296, 306 (1986). The following discussion then ensued:
[Tihe King said, that be thought the law was founded upon reason, and that he and others
had reason, as well as the Judges; to which it was answered by [Coke].... His majesty was
not learned in the laws[,] ... and causes... are not to be decided by natural reason but by
the artificial reason and judgment of law, which law is an act which requires long study and
experience, before that a man can attain to the cognizance of it.
Prohibitions,77 Eng. Rep. at 1343, quoted in Berger, "OriginalIntention" in HistoricalPerspective,
54 GEo.WASH. L. REv. 296, 306 (1986).
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revealed the overarching, fundamental laws. Thus, Coke justified the American
doctrine that judges are uniquely qualified to interpret and apply the fundamental law of the Constitution. Indeed, Coke, by nearly two centuries, presaged
Chief Justice John Marshall's assertion in Marbury v. Madison 29 that "[iut is
emphatically the province and the duty of the judicial department to say what
'30
the law is."
Though Sherry rightly concludes that Coke's statements provided a framework for the practice of judicial review long before Marbury, Sherry provides no
justification for relying on Coke to the virtual exclusion of other natural law
theorists who provided intellectual fuel for the colonists' fight with Great Britain. While she refers to these theorists' shared belief that individuals possessed
certain inalienable rights derived from divine or natural law, Sherry disregards
the essential question of whether these other theorists would have agreed with
Coke's evident belief that judges should be empowered to safeguard those rights
against legislative or executive encroachment:
The Cokean and continental notion of fundamental principles and the
more Lockean idea of fundamental rights are two sides of the same
coin: both were grounded on unwritten natural law. The difference
between the two visions-which the early Americans combined-is
largely that between republican communitarianism, which emphasizes
the relations among members of the community, and liberal individu31
alism, which stresses rights adhering to individuals of the polity.
Based on an undifferentiated reading of Cokean, Lockean, and continental natural law theory, Sherry concludes that "[t]he colonists inherited a tradition that
provided not only a justification for judicial review but also guidelines for its
'32
exercise."
B.

Continental Enlightenment Thinkers

While a comprehensive analysis of the legal and political theories influencing the American Revolution is beyond the scope of this discussion,3 3 even a
cursory examination of the theories of the continental natural law theorists who
most influenced the American colonists refutes Sherry's conclusion about judicial review. A number of scholars have documented (and Sherry does not dispute) that Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, and
Emnmrich Vattel were widely read by American colonists. 34 Yet none of these
29. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

30. Id. at 177.
31. Sherry, supra note 11, at 1132 (footnotes omitted).
32. Id. at 1145.

33. For in-depth analyses of the philosophical influences on the American colonists, see generally B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REvoLUTION (1967); F. McDONALD, supra note 22; C. MULLET, FUNDAMENTAL LAW AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1760-

1776 (1966); G. WOOD, supra note 2.
34. See, e-g., B. BAILYN, supra note 33, at 27,43; C. MULLET, supra note 33, at 84-85 n.10; C.
ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC: THE FIRST AMERICAN REVOLUTION 224 (1953);
Corwin, supra note 20, at 365, 380-82; Grey, supra note 24, at 300.
Mullet, who thoroughly canvassed American colonial literature, has concluded that the Ameri-
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theorists envisioned any type of judicial review as a check on governmental infringement of the individual rights each theorist believed natural law conferred
upon man.
For example, Grotius, whose theory such colonial luminaries as James
Otis 35 and Samuel Adams 36 employed to protest the actions of the British crown
and Parliament, expounded a theory of natural rights, but never conceived of the
judiciary as an instrument to protect those rights. To the contrary, Grotius
came perilously close to providing an apology for absolutism by concluding that,
when man enters society and submits to a sovereign's will, he must surrender his
natural rights, and that no member of society could protect those rights against
the sovereign. 37 In his famous work The Law of Peace and War, Grotius rejected "their opinion, who will have the Supreme Power to be always, and with-

out Exception, in the People, so that they restrain their Kings, as often as they
abuse their Power." 38 He asserted instead that man may renounce all of his
natural liberties upon entering society, that a people could "deliver up themselves to any one or more Persons, and transfer the Right of governing them
'39
upon him or them, without recovering any Share of that Right to themselves."
But Grotius did not stop with the premise that it was conceptually possible for a
people to renounce these liberties. He also suggested that, to preserve society, a
people must renounce the right of resisting the sovereign to whom they had
transferred power:
[A]il men naturally have a Right to secure Themselves from Injuries
by Resistance .... But civil Society being instituted for the Preservation of Peace, there immediately arises a Superior Right in the State
over us and ours, . . . for if that promiscuous Right of Resistance
should be allowed, there would no longer be a State, but a Multitude
without Union. 4°
As one philosopher has observed, however, Grotius was "Janus-faced": he
41
spoke of absolutism from one mouth, but of libertarianism from the other.
can colonists regarded Grotius, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, Montesquieu, and Vattel "as scarcely, if at
all, less authoritative than the most popular English writers." C. MULLET, supra note 33, at 32.
35. See, eg., Otis, The Rights of the British ColoniesAsserted and Proved, in I PAMPHLETS OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750-1776, at 409, 476 (B. Bailyn ed. 1965). Otis wrote some of the
most important initial pamphlets criticizing British tax measures, although he later fell from revolutionary America's grace when he retreated from his initial opposition to Great Britain's rule of the
American colonies. See Ferguson, Reason in Madness. The Political Thought of James Otis, 36 WM.
& MARY Q. 194, 194-95 (1979).
36. Eg., 2 THE WRTNGS OF SAMUEL ADAMs 435-37 (H.A. Cushing ed. 1906) [hereinafter
ADAMs's WRrnGs].

Bailyn notes that Otis paraphrased Grotius for the contradictory proposition that, while Parliament's power was necessarily absolute, natural law nonetheless precluded it from acting arbitrarily.
See B. BAILYN, supra note 33, at 205. One scholar surveying 47 colonial libraries determined that
Grotius's works appeared in 16 of those libraries. See A.E. HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEADE 119 (1968).
37. See R. TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES 77-79 (1979).
38. H. GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 64 (G.L. Williams trans. 1950), quoted in R.
TUCK, supra note 37, at 78.
39. H. GROTIUS, supra note 38, at 102, quoted in R. TUCK, supra note 37, at 78.
40. H. GROTIUS, supra note 38, at 134, quoted in R. TUCK, supra note 37, at 78-79.
41. R. TUCK, supra note 37, at 79.
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After equivocally suggesting that the people must submit to the "Law of Nonresistance" when they transferred their natural right of self-government to a sovereign, Grotius nonetheless argued that one should presume that the people did
not totally renounce the right to resist all the sovereign's abuses of power:

[T]his Law (of [Non-resistance ofl which we now treat) seems to depend on the Intention of those who first entered into civil Society, from
whom the Power of Sovereigns is originally derived. Suppose they had
been asked, Whether they pretended to impose on all Citizens the hard
Necessity of dying, rather than to take up Arms in any Case, to defend
themselves against the higher Powers; I do not know whether they
would have answered in the affirmative: It may be presumed, on the
contrary, that they have declared that one ought not to bear with every
Thing, unless Resistance would infallibly occasion great disturbance in
the State, or prove the Destruction of many Innocents. 42
Even so, the libertarian Grotius failed to conceive of any check on sovereign
misconduct except the people's right to use force to resist his unlawful demands.
Thus, Grotius, while indicating that man possesses certain natural rights and
liberties derived from natural law, did not advance any corollary premise that
natural law imposes limitations that judges may enforce against the sovereign.
Pufendorf, whom the American colonists read even more widely than Grotins, 43 replaced Grotius's vague presumption that the people do not completely
renounce their natural rights in submitting to a sovereign with a concrete mechanism by which they could preserve at least some of those rights. This mechanism, however, was not judicial review. Pufendorf contended that, in
transferring sovereignty, the people could specify the powers the sovereign acquired and the rights they retained through a written agreement, which he called
an "express convention." 44 In strikingly Cokean language, he also contended
that any sovereign actions violating that agreement would be void:
at its transfer, an
The sovereignty of a king is more strictly limited, if,
express convention is entered into between the king and citizens that he
will exercise it in accordance with certain basic laws, and on affairs,
over the disposal of which he has not been accorded absolute power, he

will consult with an assembly of the people or a council of nobles, and
that without the consent of one of the last two he will make no decision; and if he does otherwise, the citizens will not be bound by his
commands on such affairs. The people that has set the king over them
in this way is not understood to have promised to obey him absolutely
and in all things, but in so far as his sovereignty accords with their bargain and the fundamental laws, while whatever acts of his deviatefrom
42. H. GROTIUS, supra note 38, at 112, quoted in R. TucK, supra note 37, at 80.
43. See ADAMS'S WrriNGs, supra note 36, at 437; 1 THE PAPERs OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON
86 (H. Syrett ed. 1961); C. RossrrER, supra note 34, at 359; Otis, supra note 35, at 476. James Otis,
Samuel Adams, and Alexander Hamilton, among others, used Pufendorf to buttress their protests
against Great Britain.
44. S.PUFENDORF, THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 1066 (C.W. & W.A. Oldfather trans.

1934).
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them, are thereby void and without force to obligate citizens. 45
Pufendorf, however, did not embrace Coke's suggestion that judges could
pronounce void sovereign acts violating the express convention. He contended
that "[w]hat may at any particular moment work to that end [of preserving the
safety and security of society] is a matter of decision, not by those who do the
'4 6
transferring [of power], but by him on whom the power was transferred."
What Pufendorf meant when he asserted that sovereign actions contravening the
express convention were void was only that the people would not be bound by,
and would be entitled to resist, such actions:
A people has the power to use force againstits kings and bring them to
terms if they are not ruled in accordance with its desires; and, there
belongs to the people or to individuals, in the face of danger, and when
the prince becomes an enemy, the right to defend their safety against
him.4 7
Pufendorf's differences with Coke, moreover, extend beyond failing to conceive of judicial review as a means of policing the written convention between
the sovereign and the people. Pufendorf expressly rejected the Cokean premise
that natural law is enforceable against the sovereign. Although he did not contend that the sovereign is immune from divine or natural law, Pufendorf did
contend that the sovereign is "accountable for his conduct under them to none
but God.' ' 48 Thus, Pufendorf's position is utterly inconsistent with Cokean theory. Moreover, it is utterly inconsistent with Sherry's suggestion that continental natural law philosophy, at least implicitly, entailed the premise that judges
49
would employ unwritten natural law to invalidate governmental actions.
Like Pufendorf before him, Burlamaqui, another very important influence
on the American colonists, 50 asserted that the people could safeguard their natural liberties from sovereign infringement by passing written, "fundamental laws"
establishing "covenants betwixt the people and the person, on whom they confer
sovereignty, which regulate the manner of governing, and by which the supreme
45. Id. (emphasis added), quoted in Berns,JudicialReview and the Rights and Laws ofNature,

1982 Sup. Cr. REV. 49, 71.
46. Id. at 1077, quoted in Berns, JudicialReview and the Rights and Laws of Nature, 1982 Sup.

Cr. RaV. 49, 72. In a similar vein, Pufendorf also contended that, as a consequence of "the greatest
diversity of judgments ... to be observed among men, because of which an infinite number of

disputes can arise[,]" the sovereign, and not the citizens, rightfully determines "what man still retains of his natural liberty." S. PUFENDORF, supra note 44, at 1011.
47. S. PUFENDORF, supra note 44, at 1110 (emphasis added); see id. at 1105-11, 1140-45; L.
KRIEGER, THE POLITICS OF DIScRETION 143-44 (1965).
48. L. KRIEGER, supra note 47, at 145. Consistent with his view of the ruler's supremacy,

Pufendorf also contended that the ruler is "free from civil laws, or rather is superior to them." Id.
(quoting S. PUFENDORF, supra note 44, at 1055).
49. Sherry characterizes continental enlightenment theories and Cokean theory as one side of
the same coin and Lockean theory as the other side of that coin. See supra text accompanying notes
31-32.
50. See C. MULLET, supra note 33, at 78 (ranking Burlamaqui as one of the continental philosophers most frequently cited by the American colonists); see also F. McDONALD, supra note 22, at
ix (noting that James Wilson relied heavily on Burlamaqui in composing his 1774 pamphlet Considerationson the... Authority of the British Parliament). See generally R. HARVEY, JEAN JACQUES
BURLAMAQUI IN AMERICAN CONSITrUTIONALISM: A LIBERAL TRADITION (1937) (discussing
Burlamaqui's influence on the American colonists).
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power is limited."'' s Like Pufendorf, Burlamaqui asserted that sovereign actions
contravening these fundamental laws would be "void and of no effect."' 52 But
Burlamaqui also never suggested that the judiciary could control the sovereign's
conduct by interpreting the written fundamental laws, much less that the judiciary could control such conduct by interpreting unwritten natural law. Instead,
he suggested that the people could enact controls such as requiring the sovereign
to "convene a general assembly of the people, or of their representatives...
when any matters happen to fall under debate, which it was thought improper to
leave to [the sovereign's] decision."'5 3 Alternatively, Burlamaqui suggested that,
as part of the fundamental laws of the state, the people could create a formal
separation of powers, what he termed a "partition in the rights of sovereignty."'54 If these measures failed to insure that the sovereign honored his cove-

nants with the people, then Burlamaqui, like Pufendorf, viewed the people's
55
right to revolt against that sovereign as the only remaining remedy.
Burlamaqui, however, parted company with Pufendorf in maintaining that
the sovereign was answerable to the people for violating certain principles of
natural law. Burlamaqui contended that natural law imposed a fundamental
principle on all governments, including those in which "the most absolute sovereignty prevails:" 56 the law "of the public good, from which the sovereign can

never depart, without being wanting in his duty."' 57 Nonetheless, Burlamaqui
did not assert that judges should insure that the sovereign complied with this
natural law principle of public utility. Instead, he argued that the people should
punish the sovereign for noncompliance by revolting:
For since it is most certain, that God could never entrust princes with
this supreme authority, but for the good of society in general, as well as
of individuals, the exercise of this power must necessarily be limited by
the very intention, which the Deity had in conferring it on the sovereign; insomuch that the people would still have the same right of refusing to obey a prince, who, instead of concurring with the views of the
Deity, would on the contrary endeavor to cross and defeat them .... 58
For Burlamaqui, then, natural law acted as an additional check on the sovereign, but he awarded the people collectively, and not judges, the right to enforce
this check.
Vattel, who has been ranked with Pufendorf and Burlamaqui as being
59
among the most important continental influences on the American colonists,
also failed to assign judges any role in controlling the sovereign's conduct. Like
51. 2 J. BURLAMAQUI,

THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW AND POLITIC LAW

46 (T.Nugent

trans. 5th ed. 1807).
52. Id. at 47.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 50; see Berns, Judicial Review and the Rights and Laws of Nature, 1982 Sup. CT.

Rev. 49, 74 n.134.
55. See 2 J. BURLAMAQUI, supra note 51, at 41.
56. Id. at 46.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 37.
59. See C. RossrrER, supra note 34, at 359.
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Burlamaqui, Vattel asserted that natural law imposed constraints on even an
absolute sovereign, requiring the sovereign to act for "the common happiness of
all."' 6° But, like Burlamaqui, Vattel asserted that the people would be responsible for enforcing natural law by disobeying the sovereign or, in extreme cases in
61
which "he becomes the scourge of the state," by revolting against him.
Vattel also maintained that the people could regulate the ruler's conduct by
enacting a written constitution establishing "fundamental laws" by which his
sovereignty was limited:
The prince derives his authority from the nation; he possesses just so
much of it as they have thought proper to entrust him with ....
[W]hen the sovereign power is limited and regulated by the fundamental laws of the state, those laws show the prince the bounds and the
62
extent of his power, and the manner in which he is to exert it.
As an additional check on the sovereign, Vattel noted that the people may entrust legislative power to an assembly independent of the sovereign. 63 He maintained that this assembly, like the sovereign, would be bound to comply with the
constitution. Because the constitution itself would establish the assembly's powers, Vattel asserted that the assembly members could not modify that constitution "without destroying the source of their authority." 64 But Vattel did not
assign judges the right to determine when the assembly had exceeded its authority. Instead, he asserted "that if any disputes arise in the state respecting the
fundamental laws, the public administration, or the rights of the different powers of which it is composed, it belongs to the nation alone to judge and determine
65
them conformably to its political constitution."1
The theories of Grotius, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, and Vattel, then, without
exception undermine Sherry's thesis that judicial review was a logical outgrowth
of the diverse natural law tradition that the American colonists embraced.
Although Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, and Vattel all asserted that the people could
safeguard their natural liberties by establishing a written constitution that imposed limits on a sovereign's powers, each theorist contended that the peoplenot judges-would enforce that constitution by disobeying the sovereign in appropriate instances.
These continental enlightenment theories without exception also contradict
Sherry's assumption that all of the diverse natural law theories known to the
colonists validated the practice of noninterpretivist judicial review. Continental
natural law theory did not validate this practice. Indeed, only Burlamaqui and
Vattel asserted that natural law imposed legal, as well as moral, obligations on a
60. E. VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATiONS 18 (J.Chitty trans. 1859); see id. at 20-21.

61. Id. at 18; see id. at 21-22. Vattel, even more clearly than Burlamaqui, asserted that natural
law imposed an affirmative duty upon the people to revolt against the sovereign when his violations
of natural law threatened their lives or liberties. He maintained that "self-preservation is not only a
natural right, but an obligation imposed by nature, and no man can entirely and absolutely renounce
it." Id. at 22.
62. Id. at 14.
63. Id. at 12.
64. Id. at 11.
65. Id. at 12 (emphasis omitted).
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sovereign, and they denied judges any role in enforcing such legal obligations.
Instead, these theorists concluded that the people could enforce those obligations through disobedience or revolt. That conclusion embodies what Edward
Corwin has called the "naive conception of judicial review," the conception that
"nobody is bound by an unconstitutional law."' 66 But, as Corwin has pointed
out, that conception means that "everybody-including judges-has an equal
right to determine what laws he is bound by." 67 Such a conception does not
assign judges any special role in enforcing either a written constitution or unwritten natural law.
More importantly, it is doubtful whether these continental thinkers' collective failure to assign judges a role in enforcing unwritten natural law simply
reflected an oversight. As Walter Berns has pointed out, assigning to judges a
power of noninterpretive judicial review would have conflicted with two fundamental premises underlying each theorist's belief that society is created through
the union of the wills of naturally equal individuals. 68 First, these theorists'
belief in natural equality suggested that each man was free to form his own
conception of goodness and justice, and that no person's conception was inherently superior to any other person's conception. Second, their belief that society
could be created only by a consensual union of independent wills dictated that
each man must reciprocally renounce his right to define goodness for that society and, as Berns stated, required each man to "acknowledge that his opinions of
good and bad or justice and injustice have no status" in the process of governing
that society. 69 Consistent with these premises, these theorists contended that
men must, by express agreement, establish the form and powers of their governright of determining
ment and must, thereafter, surrender to the sovereign the
70
whether particular measures will serve the public good.
As Berns also has noted, assigning judges a role in enforcing the written
66. E. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 5 (1957).
67. Id.
68. Berns, supra note 54, at 74; see 2 . BURLAMAQUI, supra note 51, at 23-24, 36; S.
PUFENDORF, supranote 44, at 972; Fenwick, The Authority of Vattel, 7AM. POL. Sci. REv. 395, 397
(1913) (quoting E. VATmEL, LEs DROrT DEs GENS OU PRINCIPES DE LA Loi NATURELLE, APPLIQUE'S A' LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SUVERAINES § 4 (1758)).
69. Berns, supra note 54, at 73-74.
70. Burlamaqui, for example, contended:
It is this union of wills and of strengths, that the body politic or the state results, and
without it we could never conceive of civil society. For let the number of confederates be

ever so great, if each man was to follow his own privatejudgment in things relating to the
public good, they would only embarrass one another; and the diversity of inclinations and

judgments, arisingfrom the levity and natural inconsistency of man, would demolish all
concord, and man would thus relapse into the inconveniences of the state of nature.
2 J. BURLAMAQUI, supra note 51, at 23-24 (emphasis added). Pufendorf similarly wrote:
[A] union of wills cannot possibly be encompassed by the wills of all naturally being
lumped into one, or by only one person willing, and all the rest ceasing to do so, or by
removing in some way the natural variation of wills and their tendency to oppose each
other, and combining them into harmony. But the only final way in which many wills are

understood to be united isfor every individual to subordinatehis will to that ofone man, or a
single council, so that whatever that man or council shall decree on matters necessary to the

common security, must be regardedas the will of each and every person.
S. PUFENDORF, supra note 44, at 972, quoted in Berns, supra note 54, at 73 (emphasis added).
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terms of the people's convention or constitution would have been consistent with
the continental philosophers' natural law theories because that role would have
involved enforcing only the people's expressed will. 7 1 However, the premises
described in the preceding paragraph would be contradicted by any grant of
authority to judges to enforce natural law principles not articulated in the people's express agreement. Thus, Berns observed that:
When government is built entirely out of materials supplied by the
will-or a union of wills-that will must be expressed. In a world
where all opinions of justice and injustice are understood to be merely
private opinions, no man can rationally agree to an arrangement where
man is authorized to convert his opinion into fundamental
another
72
law.
The continental conception of natural law, then, is fundamentally different
from Coke's conception, especially with regard to the judiciary's role in government. 73 For Coke, judges possessed intellectual abilities and specialized training
that entitled them to impose their understanding of natural law or "common
right and reason" upon other men. For the continental natural law thinkers,
natural law conferred an equality upon individuals that precluded any individual
or group from imposing personal judgments about unwritten rights and principles on others.
The continental thinker Charles Montesquieu, whose separation of powers
theory constituted a profoundly important contribution to American political
theory, 74 devoted more attention to the judiciary than did the natural law theorists. But he too failed to conceive of any power of judicial review. Montesquieu
did assert that the judiciary must be given exclusive control over judicial matters
to preserve political liberty, "the tranquility of mind, arising from the opinion
each person has of his safety."7 5 Nevertheless, Montesquieu did not envision
that judges would exercise any power other than their exclusive power to adjudi76
cate criminal and civil disputes.
Montesquieu, in fact, did not even believe that a permanently appointed
judiciary was necessary to safeguard political liberty. To the contrary, he con71. Berns, supra note 54, at 74.
72. Id.
73. Cf id. at 73 (asserting that Pufendorf would have had to acknowledge that natural law was
"a legal discipline and that those who were schooled in the discipline would be entitled to exercise
authority--even if only judicial authority over other men" if he had accepted Coke's understanding
of natural law).
74. See B. BAILYN, supranote 33, at 27; F. MCDONALD, supra note 22, at 84-85; C. MULLET,
supra note 33, at 32.
75. 1 C. MoNTsQuIEu, supra note 22, at 151. Montesquieu wrote:
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same
body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same
monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative
and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would
be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined
to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression.
76. See id.
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tended that "the judicial power, so terrible to mankind" should not be "annexed
to any particular state or profession" and instead should be "as it were, invisible."'77 To achieve this "invisibility," Montesquieu asserted that "[tihe judiciary
power... should be exercised by persons taken from the body of the people at
certain times of the year, and consistently with a form and manner prescribed by
law, in order to erect a tribunal that should last only so long as necessity requires." 78 Montesquieu certainly did not suggest that these temporary tribunals
would have the power to review legislation or that such review could involve
interpreting unwritten natural law. Indeed, he suggested that these tribunals
should have no discretionary interpretive powers, that their "judgments ought
79
... to be ever conformable to the letter of the law."1
If judgments were based
on the private opinions of judges, Montesquieu warned, "people would then live
in society, without exactly knowing the nature of their obligations." 80
C.

Locke's Theory

The continental natural theorists were not alone in failing to conceive of
judges as championing man's natural rights and liberties by construing either
written laws or unwritten natural law. Locke, who greatly influenced the American colonists, 81 posited that people possessed the inalienable individual rights of
life, liberty, and estate in the state of nature and retained these rights upon making the social compact through which civil society is created.8 2 However, he
never conceived of judicial review as an institutional mechanism for safeguarding these rights. Instead, Locke regarded the people's right to dissolve the government-to revolt and withdraw from the social compact-as the ultimate
3
check on both legislative and royal abuses of power8
77. Id. at 153.
78. Id.; cf.F. MCDONALD, supra note 22, at 85 (arguing that "what Montesquieu clearly had in
mind were the juries").

79. 1 C. MoNTESQuIEu, supra note 22, at 153.
80. Id.
81. For commentators discussing Locke's contribution to the creation of the Declaration of
Independence, see infra note 124.
82. See J. LocCE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 4-11 (1979).
83. Locke wrote:
[G]overnments are dissolved... when the legislative or the prince, either of them, act
contrary to their trust
[Tihe legislative acts against the trust reposed in them when they endeavor to invade the
property of the subject, and to make themselves, or any part of the community masters or
arbitrary disposers of the lives, liberties, or fortunes of the people ....
Whenever the
legislators endeavor to take away and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them

to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the people
who are thereupon absolved of any further obedience .... [B]y this breach of trust they
forfeit the power the people have put into their hands for quite contrary ends .... What I
have said here concerning the legislative in general holds true also concerning the supreme
executor [the king], who having a double trust put in him, both to have a part in the
legislative and the supreme execution of the law-acts against both when he goes about to
set up his own arbitrary will as the law of society.
Id. at 123-24.
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Locke also believed that the people's liberties were best safeguarded by a
paramount legislature:
In all cases, while the government subsists, the legislative is the
supreme power: for what can give laws to another must needs be superior to him;... [B]y the right it has to make laws for all the parts and
for every member of society, prescribing rules to their actions, and giving power of execution, where they are transgressed, the legislative
must needs be the supreme, and all other powers in any
members or
84
parts of the society, derived from and subordinate to it.
In Locke's view, only the legislature had the requisite authority to make law
binding on the people because only the legislature was chosen by the people:
[The] legislative is not only the supreme power of the commonwealth,
but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community have
once placed it; nor can any edict of anybody else, in what form soever
conceived or by what power backed, have theforce and obligation of law
which has not its sanctionfrom that legislative which thepublic has chosen and appointed; for without this the law could not have that which
is absolutely necessary to its being a law: the consent of the society
over whom nobody can have a power to make laws, by their own consent and by authority received from them .... 85
Locke's theory of legislative supremacy suggests that he would have found
any form of judicial interpretation of legislation objectionable and that he clearly
would have objected to the practice of noninterpretivist review.8 6 Judicial review of legislation based upon a written constitution arguably would be inconsistent with Locke's theory. This practice could result in unelected judges
substituting their interpretation of legislation for the elected legislature's interpretation of a given law. Noninterpretivist review, which would permit judges
to invalidate positive legislation on the basis of unenacted and unwritten natural
law, clearly would be inconsistent with his theory. This practice would permit
judges to engage in a form of law-making that Locke believed was the legislature's exclusive domain.
D. Whig Opposition Theory
Locke was not the only English thinker inspiring the American colonists'
fight with Great Britain who failed to conceive of judicial review. A number of
thinkers, who belonged to a diverse group espousing English opposition or
"Country" ideology,8 7 also were influential. The colonists employed the arguments of "Country" thinkers who spanned the political spectrum from radical
Tories on the right-including most notably Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke 8 8-to radical Whigs on the left. However, the thinkers to whom the
84. Id. at 85.
85. Id. at 75 (emphasis added).
86. Cf. Corwin, supranote 20, at 404 (asserting that, for Locke, "the maintenance of higher law
is entrusted to legislative supremacy").

87. For a discussion of the characteristics of "Country" ideology, see supra note 16.
88. Bolingbroke shared with the left-leaning Whig advocates of "Country" ideology the con-
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American colonists turned for a solution to what they viewed as British despotism were radical Whigs. These Whigs included John Trenchard, Thomas
Gordon,8 9 and these men's ideological heirs, Richard Price, Joseph Priestly, and
James Burgh. 90
Trenchard and Gordon, who popularized radical Whig theory in Cato's
Letters,9 1 devoted far more attention to the corrupting influence of power than
did Locke. They accordingly were unwilling to defend legislative supremacy or
any other form of governmental supremacy. Because these Whigs, unlike
Locke, dialectically viewed politics as a war between the rulers and the people
they ruled, 92 Trenchard and Gordon were far more concerned with the means
by which all governmental power could be controlled.

Despite their differences with Locke, however, Trenchard and Gordon excern that English political institutions had become profoundly corrupt and that the nation was sliding toward tyranny. See B. BAILYN, supra note 33, at 49-51. Although he also shared the Whigs'
belief that Parliament and, particularly, the House of Commons must be independent from the executive, he did not share the Whigs' confidence that electoral reform would reverse the degeneration of
England's political institutions. See Liddle, "A4
PatriotKing, or None" Lord Bolingbroke and the
American Renunciationof George III, 65 J.AM. HIST. 951, 954 (1979). Bolingbroke believed that
the people themselves had become corrupt and that a "Patriot King," who would "espouse no party,
but.., govern like a common father of his people," was needed to reverse this process. Id. (quoting
1 H. BOLINGBROKE, THE WORKS OF THE LATE RIGHT HONORABLE HENRY ST. JOHN, LORD
VISCOUNT BOLINGBROKE 294-95 (D. Mallet ed. 1774)).
Although the American colonists obviously did not adopt Bolingbroke's solution, he nonetheless was widely read. See B. BAILYN, supra note 33, at 49-51; Boyer, BorrowedRhetoric: The MassachusettsExcise Controversy of 1754, 21 WM. & MARY Q. 328, 328-51 (1964). Bailyn suggests that
Americans habitually thought of Bolingbroke as a libertarian, despite his authoritarian leanings,
because Bolingbroke approvingly quoted radical Whigs such as Trenchard and Gordon on many
subjects, and younger radical Whigs such as Burgh quoted Bolingbroke approvingly. See B.
BAILYN, supra note 33, at 39 n.22.
89. LIBERTARIAN HERITAGE FROM THE WRITINGS OF JOHN TRENCHARD AND THOMAS
GORDON vii-viii (D. Jacobson ed. 1965) (Jacobson's introduction) [hereinafter D. JACOBSON]; accord
B. BAILYN, supra note 33, at 35-36, 40,45; F. McDONALD, supra note 22, at 70; C. MULLET, supra
note 33, at 59-65; cf. C. ROSSITER, supra note 34, at 360 (noting that reprints of these authors' works
"appeared everywhere in the colonies").
90. See W. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 154-56 (1981); C. ROssrrER,
supra note 34, at 141, 360; G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 16. See generally C. ROBBINS, THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY COMMONWEALTHMEN: STUDIES IN THE TRANSMISSION, DEVELOPMENT, AND
CIRCUMSTANCE OF ENGLISH LIBERAL THOUGHT FROM THE RESTORATION OF CHARLES II UNTIL
THE WAR WITH THE THIRTEEN COLONIES (1959) (discussing the theories of these later radilqs).

This list of theorists is not intended to be exhaustive. Many other sixteenth and seventeenth
century English thinkers influenced both the Whigs discussed above and the more erudite American
colonists. See, eg., B. BAILYN, supra note 33, at 44-45. John Adams, for example, identified the
works of Sidney, Harrington, Milton, Needham, and Burnet, along with the works of Locke and
Hoadly as establishing the fundamental principles of legitimate government. Id. at 45. For a discussion of the theories of a number of important sixteenth and seventeenth century Englishmen, see
generally J.G.A. POCOCK,THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW (1957).
Learned Americans also were schooled in the ancient Greek writings of Plato, Aristotle, and
Polybius, and the ancient Roman writings of Cicero and Tacitus. See C. MULLET, supra note 33, at
13-16; see also Corwin, supra note 20, at 153-64 (discussing the classical conception of natural law).
91. See D. JACOBSON, supra note 89, at 38-274 (partial reprint of Trenchard & Gordon, CATO'S
LETTERS (1720-1723) [hereinafter CATO'S LErrERS]); see also D. JACOBSON, supra note 89, at 6-36
(partial reprint of Trenchard & Gordon, THE INDEPENDENT WHIG (1720) [hereinafter THE INDEPENDENT WHIG]).

92. See G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 18. In this regard, Gordon wrote: "Whatever is good for
the People is bad for their Governors; and what is good for the Governors, is pernicious to the
People." Id. (quoting 2 J. TRENCHARD & T. GORDON, CATO'S LETTERS: OR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY,
CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS, AND OTHER IMPORTANT SUBJECTS 249 (5th ed. 1748)).
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ploited many Lockean themes. Like Locke, they maintained that society was
founded on a compact between the governors and the governed. 9 3 With the
caveat that frequent elections were necessary to prevent corruption, Trenchard
and Gordon also believed that the legislature, rather than the other branches of
94
government, was the vanguard of the people's inalienable rights and liberties.
"Cato" maintained that "[t]he only Secret... in forming a free government is to
make the Interests of the Governors and of the Governed the same, as far as
human Policy can contrive."9 5 He contended that this end, in turn, could be
realized only through an electoral process enabling the people to choose "Deputies, whose Interests... [are] the same as their own, and whose property is so
intermingled with theirs, and so engaged upon the same bottom, that Principals
96
and Deputies must stand and fall together."

Trenchard's and Gordon's theory shared another similarity with Locke's
theory: the implicit rejection of judicial review as a means of policing the people's compact with their governors. Indeed, even more forcibly than Locke,
"Cato" insisted that the people retain the ultimate right, through revolt, to sanction their governors for breaching their trust and violating their compact. After
considering the question "who shall be the Judge whether the Magistrate acts

justly, and pursues his Trust," "Cato" emphatically concluded that only the
people, and not any institutional judge,
97

are entitled

to make this

determination:
Where the Interest of the Governors and that of the Governed clash,
there can be no statedjudge between them ....

In such case, Recourse

93. In language reminiscent of Locke, Gordon asserted:
The entering of political Society, is so far from a departure from his natural Right, that to
preserve it was the sole reason why men did so; and mutual Protection and assistance is the
only reasonable Purpose of all reasonable Societies .... In order to achieve this good End,
the Magistrate is entrusted with conducting and applying the united Force of the Community; and with exacting such a share of every Man's Property, as is necessary to preserve
the Whole, and to defend every Man and His Property from foreign and domestic injuries.
These are the Boundaries of the Power of the Magistrate, who deserts his Function whenever he breaks them.
CATo's LETrEPs, supra note 91, at 128 (Gordon No. 62, Jan. 20, 1721).
94. Trenchard contended:
No way is left, but ... to make the Deputies [i.e. popularly elected legislators] so numerous, that there may be no way of corrupting the Majority; or, by changing them so often
that there is no sufficient Time to corrupt them, and to carry the ends of that Corruption.
The People may be sure, that the major Part of their Deputies being honest will keep the
rest so; and that they will all be honest, when they have no Temptations to be Knaves.
Id., at 121 (Trenchard No. 60, Jan. 6, 1721).
The corruption of Parliament was a recurrent theme for "Country" writers of all political
stripes. See Pocock, supra note 16, at 563, 574. Pocock explains that, for these "Country" writers,
the term "corruption" embraced all the means by which Parliament could be subverted by the
Crown. Id. at 565. For a discussion of the distinguishing characteristics of "Country" thought, see
supra note 16.
95. CATO'S LETTERS, supra note 91, at 120 (Trenchard No. 60, Jan. 6, 1721).
96. Id. at 121 (Trenchard No. 60, Jan. 6, 1721). Note, however, that, for the Whigs, the
people's political participation was confined to the House of Commons. See G. WOOD, supra note 2,
at 24-25.
97. "Cato" asserted that the premise "[t]hat Subjects were not to judge their Governors, or
rather for themselves in the Business of Government, which of all Things concerns them most, was
an Absurdity." CATO'S LETrERS, supra note 91, at 111 (Trenchard No. 59, Dec. 30, 1720).
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must be had to the first Principles of Government itself; which being a
departure from the State of Nature, and a Union of many families
forming themselves into a political Machine for Mutual Protection and
Defense, it is evident, that this formed Relation can no longer exist
than the Machine subsists and can act; and when it does not, the Individual must return to their former state again .... Government is
only an Apportionment of one or more Persons, to do certain Actions
for the Good and Emolument of the Society; and if the Persons thus
interested will not act at all, or act contrary to their trust, their Power
must return of Course to those who gave it.98
Judicial review of legislation, then, conflicts with "Cato's" Whig ideology. This
practice deprives the people of the right to abolish a government through revolt,
and supplants their right with the judiciary's right to invalidate statutes or decrees as the ultimate sanction for governmental misconduct.
Without departing significantly from the fundamental premises advanced
by "Cato," the younger Whigs-Price, Priestly, and Burgh-refined "Cato's"
theory of representational government. They asserted that the people's liberty
could be realized and their natural liberties protected only when the people
themselves participated in making laws. Price, for example, contended that
"CIVIL LIBERTY ...is the power of a civil society or a state to govern itself by
its own discretion; or by laws of its own making." 99 Similarly, Priestly asserted
that men can have no political liberty if they "have no share in government."l ° °
Burgh likewise concluded that government controlled by one or a few individuals was impossible "without continual danger to liberty." 10 1 For these Whigs,
the popularly elected legislature, derived from the people, controlled by the people, and acting on their behalf, was the bastion of the people's rights and
liberties.
Having absorbed the lessons of history and the teachings of their Whig
predecessors, however, these radicals knew that the legislature was not immune
from corruption and could itself betray the people's trust. To prevent the legislature from abusing its power or from being subverted by the executive, they
embraced "Cato's" remedy of frequent elections.' 0 2 If these measures failed and
the legislature enacted laws abridging the people's fundamental rights, then, like

Trenchard and Gordon, these thinkers maintained that only the people could

safeguard their rights by exercising their right to revolt.' 0 3 Thus, judicial review
98. Id. at 113-14 (Trenchard No. 59, Dec. 30, 1720) (emphasis added); cf. id. at 133 (Gordon
No. 62, Jan. 20, 1721) (Gordon defending the people's right of resistance and asserting that "they
have the least Reason to bear Evil and Oppression from their Governors, who of all Men are the
most obliged to do them Good").
99. G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 24 (quoting R. PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF
CIVIL LIBERTY, THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE JUSTICE AND POLICY OF WAR
WITH AMERICA 3 (1776)).

100. W. AmAMs, supra note 90, at 155 (quoting J.PRIESTLY, FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT 14 (1775)).
101. G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 23 (quoting J. BURGH, POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS: OR AN
INQUIRY INTO PUBLIC ERRORS, DEFECTS, AND ABUSES 106-07 (1774)).
102. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
103. G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 292.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

was equally inconsistent with these younger Whigs' theory because they, like
"Cato" and Locke, believed that the people's right to revolt was the ultimate

sanction for governmental abuses of power.10 4
Judicial review is inconsistent with the younger Whigs' theory for a second
reason. Advancing the premise that the people could best safeguard their fundamental rights derived from natural law by sharing in the political franchise,
these Whigs stressed more clearly than Trenchard and Gordon had that the
participatory aspect of government is a prerequisite for political liberty.10 5 Even
judicial enforcement of a written constitution against the legislature would arguably conflict with the younger Whigs' opposition theory. This practice could
permit judges, who were not subject to the people's electoral control, to alter the
elected legislature's interpretation of the constitution.10 6 Noninterpretivist judicial review clearly would conflict with the younger Whigs' theory. This practice
would permit unelected judges to void positive legislation enacted by the people's elected representatives based on unwritten natural law principle that the
people's representatives had not adopted. Thus, noninterpretivist judicial review
could deprive the people of the meaningful participation in the legislative process that the Whig opposition leaders believed was vital to preserve individual

rights.
E. Protestant Theology
Other philosophical traditions that influenced the American colonists also
conflicted with the practice of judicial review. One tradition was Protestant religious philosophy and, particularly, Puritan covenant theology, the foundation of

New England republicanism.10 7 The Puritans rejected the Catholic doctrine

104. Cf. J. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 186-90 (1955)
(noting that the Whigs believed natural law imposed limitations upon the legislature's powers, but
embraced the right of resistance and denied judges any role in enforcing natural law). Burgh, for
example, wrote: "In planning a government by representation, the people ought to provide against
their own annihilation. They ought to establish a ... method of acting by and for themselves,
without or even in opposition to their representatives ... ." G. WOOD, supranote 2, at 323 (quoting
J. BURGH, POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS: OR AN INQUIRY INTO PUBLIC ERRORS, DEFECTS, AND
ABUSES 6 (1774)); see also Robbins, Algernon Sidney's DiscoursesConcerning Government, 24 WM.
& MARY Q. 267, 280-81 (1966) (noting that Sidney maintained that the people could never renounce
their right to revolt against either the Crown's or the Parliament's abuses of power).
105. Cf. W. ADAMS, supra note 90, at 155 (noting that younger Whigs expanded Trenchard's
and Gordon's "concept of liberty by adding to the conventional idea of'civil liberty' that of'political
liberty' "). For example, Price maintained that inherent in the concept of liberty "is one general idea
...the idea of Self-Direction or Self-Government." Id. at 156 (emphasis in original) (quoting R.
PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY, THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT,
AND THE JUSTICE AND POLICY OF WAR WITH AMERICA 2-3 (1776)). Priestly similarly emphasized
the self-directing nature of liberty, asserting that liberty encompassed the right of each individual,
through the electoral process, "to have his private opinion or judgment become that of the public,
and thereby control the actions of others." J. PRIESTLY, FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT 155
(1775), quoted in W. ADAMS, supra note 90, at 155.
106. Indeed, Whigs and "Country" writers generally were suspicious of legal interpretation. Because they believed that laws would serve rather than smother liberty only if laws were accessible
and comprehensible to the people, any judicial interpretation of laws could smother liberty by contorting or complicating the meaning of those laws. See Powell, The OriginalUnderstandingof OriginalIntent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 891-92 (1985). The Protestants also advocated the simplification
of laws and distrusted legal interpretation. See infra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
107. See B. BAILYN, supra note 33, at 332-33; F. McDoNALD, supra note 22, at 70-74; see also

1991]

NATURAL LAW AND ORIGINAL INTENT

that God had ordained the Pope and his council as the authoritative interpreters
of the scripture.10 8 Indeed, for the Puritans, and for all Protestants, any interpretation of scripture necessarily was "human invention" that corrupted the
meaning of the Bible.' 0 9 Conversely, the Puritans believed that all individuals
were equally qualified to ascertain God's message by adhering to the plain words
of the scripture.110 The egalitarianism implicit in this belief, combined with distrust of biblical interpretation, resulted in distrust of judicial interpretation of
laws.111 In both England and the American colonies, this distrust produced

calls for legal reform that would simplify the laws and preclude judicial discretion in the enforcement of statutes. 112 As Thomas Grey has observed in explaining this phenomenon: "The scriptural analogue to constitutional textualism is
113
the Protestant doctrine that the Bible is the sole vehicle for divine revelation."

F. Scottish Common Sense School
The philosophy of the Scottish Common Sense School was yet another im-

portant influence upon American revolutionary thought.1 4 Francis Hutcheson,
Thomas Reid, Adam Ferguson, and Adam Smith, 115 among others, espoused

T. BALDWIN, THE NEW ENGLAND CLERGY AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1928); Morgan,
The Puritan Ethic and the American Revolution, 24 WM. & MARY Q. 3-43 (1967) (both discussing
the relationship between Puritan religious and republican political philosophy).
108. See Powell, supra note 106, at 889-90. Under Catholic doctrine, "Christ conferred infallibility upon the Holy Office in matters of faith and morals." E. GERHART, AMERICAN LIBERTY AND
NATURAL LAW 90 (1953).
109. See Powell, supra note 106, at 890. John Selden, for example, wrote that interpreting the
scripture was something "which a discreet Man may do well; but 'tis his scripture, not the Holy
Ghost['s]." Id. (quoting J. SELDEN, TABLE-TALK: BEING THE DiscouRsEs OF JOHN SELDEN,
ESQ. 45 (1699)) (brackets in original). Martin Luther more emphatically asserted that "[n]o believing Christian can be coerced beyond holy writ." Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L.
REV.1, 5 (1984) (quoting R.BAINTON, HERE I STAND 116 (1951)).
110. Cf. Powell, supra note 106, at 890 n.26 (noting that "[olrthodox and liberal [Protestants]
alike agreed... that the sober and unprejudiced reader would find little need to interpret scripture
because such a reader would have no difficulty in understanding the plain meaning of the text").
111. For a discussion of the democratic political implications of Puritan theology, see B.
BAILYN, supra note 33, at 303; F. McDONALD, supra note 22, at 87-89; Corwin, supra note 20, at
397.
112. Powell, supra note 106, at 891; see G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 296-302 (discussing American distrust of judicial discretion). In 1656, for example, the Puritan lawyer William Sheppard
published a critique of the British legal system in which he advocated a complete codification of
Britain's "obscure" laws, a "codification" that would require judges to eschew interpretation and
instead simply apply the plain meaning of the code as "settled law." Powell, supranote 106, at 891
(quoting E.DUMBAULD, THOMAs JEFFERSON AND THE LAW 146 (1978)). This critique was entitled England's Balme. See id.
113. Grey, supra note 109, at 5.
114. See F. McDoNALD, supra note 22, at 54-55. See generally G. WILLS, INVENTING
AMERICA: THOMAS JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1978) (discussing the Scottish Common Sense School's influence on revolutionary American thought).
115. For a discussion of the theories developed by these thinkers and by other Scottish enlightenment thinkers, see P. STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION 9-14, 23-50 (1980). David Hume also participated
in the Scottish enlightenment movement, and he too was an important influence on American political theory. See, eg., F. McDONALD, supra note 22, at 188. Hume's profound moral and political
skepticism, however, distinguished him from Scottish Common Sense thinkers such as Hutcheson,

who believed that man's innate sense of morality generally disposed him to do good. See id. at 54;
Moore, Hume's PoliticalScience and the ClassicalRepublican Tradition, 10 CAN. J. POL. Sci. 809,
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this School. These thinkers, like the continental enlightenment thinkers,11 6 articulated a markedly egalitarian doctrine.1 17 Proponents of the Scottish Common Sense School maintained that all men possess inherently equal moral
faculties through which to perceive goodness, justice and charity.1 18 This position had profound political implications. Hutcheson, for example, maintained
that individuals' innate moral equality also mandated their political equality and
freedom.119 He wrote: "In this respect, all men are originally equal, ... these
natural rights equally belong to all, at least as soon as they come to the mature
use of reason; and they are equally confirmed to all by the law of nature ....
Nature makes none master, none slaves." 120 The Common Sense School's position, espousing that men have innately equal moral faculties enabling them to
reach independently valid judgments about justice and injustice with the use of
their native reason, is diametrically opposed to the Cokean position, espousing
that judges schooled "in the artificial reason of the law" are best qualified to

make such judgments. The Common Sense School's position is also inconsistent
with the practice of judicial review because that practice entitles judges to impose their determinations regarding justice upon people equally qualified to
make such determinations themselves. Indeed, as Forest McDonald has observed, from the School's position, "it is but a short step to radical democracy,"' 121 which denies judges any role in interpreting the laws and grants to the
people alone, through their representatives, the right to set the meaning of the
law. 122

The preceding discussion demonstrates that Sherry is incorrect in equating
820-22 (1977). On Hutcheson's influence upon early American political theory, see Robbins, The
Philosophy of FrancisHutcheson, 11 Wm. & MARY Q. 214, 214-51 (1954).
Although Gary Wills demonstrates the importance of this School's contribution to American
thought, the work of a number of scholars suggests that he vastly has overstated the extent of the
School's influence. See, e.g., Hamowy, Jefferson and the Scottish Enlightenment: A Critique of Gary
Wills's Inventing America, 36 WM. & MARY Q. 503, 505 (1979); Jaffa, Inventing the Past: Gary
Wills'InventingAmerica and the PathologyofIdeologicalScholarship, 33 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 3, 3-19
(1981); Lynn, FalsifyingJefferson, 66 COMMENTARY 66, 66-71 (1978).
116. See supra notes 33-80 and accompanying text. Some of the egalitarian correlations between
continental enlightenment thought and Scottish enlightenment thought may not have been accidental. Burlamaqui, for example, studied Hutcheson's works. See Hamowy, supra note 115, at 518.
117. See B. BAILYN, supra note 33, at 303; F. MCDONALD, supra note 22, at 87-89; G. WOOD,
supra note 2, at 118; Corwin, supra note 20, at 397.
118. See 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 94 (1967).
119. See G. WILLS, supra note 114, at 228. Not all of the members of the Scottish Common
Sense School were political philosophers. For example, Thomas Reid, the School's founder, concerned himself with ethics and epistemology. See 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 118-19 (1967).
But he too maintained that all men possessed inherently equal moral faculties that enable them to
comprehend right, wrong and other ethical precepts through the use of their common sense. See 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 118, at 94.
120. 4 F. HUTCHESON, A SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 143-44 (1755), quoted in G. WILLS,
supra note 114, at 228.
121. F. MCDONALD, supra note 22, at 54.
122. Cf. G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 301-02 (noting that the radical democrats believed that, "if
the spirit of the law ...

[must] be considered ....

representatives of the people").

then it should be done only on appeal to the
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with Cokean theory the natural law tradition that the American colonists embraced in revolting against the British Crown. Cokean theory gave the colonists
only one vision of natural law and one system for safeguarding liberty-a system
in which judges as an expert elite would define the social order and dispense
justice to the populace. Juxtaposed against that vision was another vision flowing from such diverse sources as continental enlightenment theory, Whig opposition theory, Scottish Common Sense School theory, and Protestant theology.
This vision offered the colonists a competing system for safeguarding liberty-an
egalitarian system of majoritarian democracy in which inherently free and morally equal individuals would collectively define the social order and would, by
common agreement, dispense justice consistent with that order.

The prominence that this competing vision of natural law acquired is revealed in two of revolutionary America's most important documents: Thomas
Paine's famous tract Common Sense;12 3 and the Declaration of Independence. 124 In Common Sense, Paine rejected the premise that any man is inherently more qualified than other men to establish values for society, asserting that
"exalting one man so greatly above the rest, cannot be justified on the equal
rights of nature." 125 Accordingly, Paine exhorted America to free herself from

the corrupt English monarchy 1 26 and to form a new government founded upon
truly egalitarian, republican principles. To implement these principles, he advocated adopting a confederated government comprised of the several states, and
establishing unicameral legislatures within each state that would be elected annually by a system with "representation more equal."' 1 27 This egalitarian sys-

tem, Paine assured his audience, would immunize American government from
corruption, for when "there are no distinctions there can be no superiority; perfect equality affords no temptation."' 128 As Thomas Grey conceded in his article' 2 9 in which he, like Sherry, sought to establish an historical justification for
123. For a discussion of Paine's role in propelling the American colonies into war with the
British, see B. BAILYN, supra note 33, at 285-87. For a partial reprint of Common Sense, see J.
LEwIs, THOMAS PAINE AUTHOR OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 55-80 (1947).
124. See generally Hamowy, supra note 115, at 513-23 (comparing Locke's Second Treatise and
Thomas Jefferson's Declaration of Independence). But see generally J. LEwis, supra note 123 (contending that Paine, not Jefferson, wrote the initial draft of the Declaration of Independence).
Gary Wills contends that the Declaration was not modeled on Locke's Second Treatise, but on
the writings of the Scottish Common Sense School, particularly those of Francis Hutcheson. See G.
WILLs, supra note 114, at 230-34. Hamowy, however, has convincingly discredited that argument.
See Hamowy, supra note 115; see also W. BERNS, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY 242-51
(1987) (appendix devoted to critiquing Wills's interpretation of the Declaration of Independence).
125. Paine, Common Sense, reprintedin J. LEwH,supra note 123, at 59 [hereinafter Common
Sense].
126. See, eg., id at 61-65.
127. Id. at 70.
128. Id. Although Paine's radical democratic theory won a following among some American
patriots, particularly in Pennsylvania, other patriots, including John Adams, rejected his theory as
providing a recipe for anarchy. See B. BAILYN, supra note 33, at 286-95. Relying on the older
English theory of mixed government, Adams, at least by the 1770s, believed that a republican government must consist of a bicameral legislature in which the upper house embodied the aristocracy,

and that the executive (the American counterpart of the English crown) must possess an absolute
veto on legislation. See G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 203-06, 580-87.
129. See generally Grey, supra note 24 (evaluating the historical justification for noninterpretivist judicial review).
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noninterpretivist judicial review, Paine's view of natural law embraced "the

principles of majoritarian democracy, and hence provide[d] little basis for claims
of superior access to fundamental law on the part of specially trained elite
130
judges."
In words that should scarcely require repeating, the Declaration of Independence echoed Paine's egalitarian theme. The Declaration pronounced "that
all men are created equal and independent," and "that from that equal Creation
they derive Rights inherent and unalienable," including "the right to alter or
abolish" a government and "to institute new Government, laying its Foundations on Such Principles... as to them Shall Seem most likely to effect their
Safety and Happiness." 131 As Grey also conceded, "Jefferson's Declaration,"
like Paine's Common Sense, eschewed Cokean natural law theory, instead justifying revolution "in terms of Lockean natural rights" and embracing the Whig
remedy of the "moral right of the people to 'alter or abolish' governments" that
132
contravened those rights.

IL

NaturalLaw Theory TranslatedInto Early American Practice
A. Early State Constitutions

To demonstrate that the states translated Cokean natural law theory into
practice in the beginning years of the Republic, Sherry evaluates their first attempts at constitution-making. She asserts that Cokean natural law theory and
English constitutional theory generally established a dichotomy under which a
written constitution possessed both law-creating and law-declaring attributes. 133
On the one hand, written constitutions created a scheme of government and
certain positive rights flowing from the limited powers delegated to that government. On the other hand, such constitutions merely declared generally recognized natural law rights that supposedly existed prior to formation of societies
and prior to the enactment of positive laws.
Sherry contends that this distinction between provisions limiting governmental powers and those declaring rights suggests that fundamental individual
rights based on natural law need not be enacted to be legally enforceable, and
that consequently judges were authorized to apply unwritten natural law when
faced with questions implicating individual rights. 134 Because seven states established a bifurcated constitutional scheme in which their "Declaration[s] of
Rights" were separated from their "Frame[s] of Government," 135 she argues
130. Id. at 891.
131. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
132. Grey, supra note 24, at 890-91.
133. See Sherry, supra note 11, at 1132-34.
134. See id. at 1135.
135. Id. at 1133. The states establishing such bifurcated constitutional schemes were Delaware,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. See B.
SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 276 (DEL. DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS of 1776) (1980); F. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR
HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 562 (DEL. CONST. of 1776); 'a at 1686,

1691 (MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS & CONST. of 1776); id. at 1889, 1893 (MAss. DECLARATION
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that the drafts of these constitutions embraced the dichotomy inherent in
Cokean theory between constitutionally declared, preexisting natural rights and
constitutionally established positive rights. She also notes that six state constitutions and declarations of rights specifically characterized the individual rights
they delineated as "natural," "inherent," "essential," or "inalienable." 136 She
contends that these constitutions similarly suggest that the early state constitution drafters believed that they were declaring only preexisting natural rights.
Based on the supposed acceptance of Cokean theory revealed in the dichotomous structure of these constitutions, Sherry implies that these drafters also
must have accepted Cokean doctrine with respect to noninterpretivist judicial
review. 137
The existence of the apparent dichotomy between governmental powers and
individual rights present in these early constitutions, however, does not establish
that these constitutions embodied Cokean theory. These constitutions both
failed to authorize judicial review and severely limited the judicial independence

required for the growth of this practice.
The 1776 constitutions of New Jersey and South Carolina did not even es-

tablish the judiciary as a separate branch of government.1 38 A number of other
OF RIGHTS & CONST. of 1780); id. at 2453, 2458 (N.H. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS & CONST. of
1784); id at 2787, 2789 (N.C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS & CONST. of 1776); id at 3082, 3084 (PA.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS & CONST. of 1776); id. at 3812, 3814 (VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS &
CONST. of 1776) (1909).
136. Sherry, supra note 11, at 1133 & n.30 (citing B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 135, at 277 (DEL.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 2); F. THORPE, supranote 135, at 1889 (MAss. DECLARATION
OF RIGHTS of 1780, art. I); i at 2453-54 (N.H. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1784, art. I-IV); id. at
2625-26 (N.Y. CONST. of 1777, preamble); idL at 3082 (PA. DECLARATION OF IGHTS of 1776, arts.
I-I); i at 3813 (VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 1)).
137. See Sherry, supra note 11, at 1134 (contending that "[b]y the 1780's the 'constitution' of an
American state consisted of fundamental law (both positive and natural), the inherent and inaliena-

ble rights of man (whether declared or not), and the recipe for a governmental mixture that would
best protect and preserve the fundamental law and natural law rightst,]" and that this concept of a
"constitution ... served as the basis for the practical exercise of judicial review").
Future Chief Justice John Marshall's remarks during the Virginia ratifying convention suggest a
contrary interpretation. As discussed infra text accompanying note 305, Marshall contended that
because Virginia's Bill of Rights was separate from its Constitution, the Bill of Rights was merely
"recommendatory." This remark suggests that when the early state constitution drafters created
bifurcated constitutions in which they positively enacted the forms of government but merely declared fundamental individual rights, the drafters believed that the enacted provisions were legally
enforceable, while the declared provisions contained only moral desiderata.
In a careful study of the concept of "rights" embodied in the early state constitutions, Robert
Palmer also rejects Sherry's interpretation. Palmer, Liberties as ConstitutionalProvisions,in CONsTITUTION AND RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 55 (1987). Palmer suggests that the
drafters of these early constitutions embraced an eighteenth century conception of "rights" that
stands in stark contrast to the twentieth century conception of rights as imposing affimative constraints on government. This older conception regarded rights as establishing only moral principles
through which government should be conducted. Id. at 61-75. Owing to that eighteenth century
conception, Palmer suggests that the drafters of seven of the early state constitutions created separate Declarations of Rights and Frames of Government because they regarded the Declarations as
setting out "principles of government" rather than "rigid exceptions to power." Id. at 84; see id. at
61-75. In support of this interpretation, Palmer points out that the Pennsylvania, Virginia, and
Maryland Declarations of Rights used the precatory term "ought" when enumerating rights. Id. at
64-69.
138. See W. ADAMS, supra'note90, at 266-67; C.G. HAINES, supra note 24, at 68-69. The New
Jersey Constitution, for example, established a tripartite scheme of government in which governmen-
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constitutions that did establish the judiciary as a separate branch of government
nonetheless limited its independence. The 1776 Pennsylvania and 1777 Vermont
constitutions, and the Connecticut and Rhode Island constitutions, which consisted of slightly modified versions of those states' colonial charters,' 3 9 all limited judicial terms in office to a specified number of years. 140 The 1776 South
Carolina and 1777 Georgia Constitutions also limited judicial independence by
providing that many judges would serve at either the executive's or the legislature's pleasure. 14 1 Moreover, even the 1776 Virginia and 1778 Massachusetts
constitutions, which first explicitly confirmed the judiciary's independence as a
component of a government of separated powers and granted judges permanent
tenure during good behavior, 142 undermined judicial independence. These constitutions authorized the legislature to control judicial salaries and fees. 14 3 As
Professor McDonald has observed, these first constitutions suggest that, in the
early years of the Republic, "the notion that the judges should be so independent
as to have the power to overrule juries or to pass upon the constitutionality of
laws enacted by legislative bodies was alien to American theory and
practice." 144
The virtual impotence that the first state constitutions imposed upon the
judiciary cannot be attributed to Cokean theory. To the contrary, these early
constitutions embodied the competing democratic or egalitarian theory of natural law that gained prominence in the American colonies and ultimately found
expression in the Declaration of Independence and Thomas Paine's pamphlet
tal powers were divided among the executive and the two houses of the legislature. See F. McDoNALD, supra note 22, at 84-85; F. THORPE, supra note 135, at 2595 (N.J. CONST. of 1776, § 1).
139. Connecticut and Rhode Island did not actually adopt new constitutions until 1818 and
1842, respectively. W. ADAMS, supra note 90, at 66-68.
140. See G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 161 n.65. Pennsylvania and New Jersey judges held office
for seven years. Vermont, Connecticut, and Rhode Island judges were elected annually. Id.
141. The South Carolina Constitution provided that justices of the peace would serve "during

pleasure" of the executive, but also provided that superior courtjudges could be removed from office
only for misconduct. W. ADAMS, supranote 90, at 267. The Georgia Constitution provided that the
Chief Justice would be elected annually, but that all other judges would hold office at the legislature's pleasure. G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 161 n.65.
142. See W. ADAMS, supra note 90, at 268-69. The 1776 Virginia Constitution provided: "The
legislative, executive and judiciary departments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise
the powers properly belonging to the other: nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than
one of them at the same time." Id. at 267. The Massachusetts Constitution provided:
The legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either
of them: The executive shall never exercise the legislative or judicial powers, or either of
them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative or executive powers, or either of them:
To the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.
Id. at 269.
The proposal to give judges lifetime tenure met with considerable opposition in Massachusetts.
See id. at 270. In fact, the town of Lennox rejected Massachusetts's 1778 constitution because giving
judges such tenure was "making the delegated Power greater than the Constituent... the Creature
greater than the Creator." Id. (quoting WESTERN MASSACHUSETrS IN THE REVOLUTION 61 (R.
Taylor ed. 1954)).
143. G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 161; cf. 1 J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNrrED STATES 98 n.9 (1971) (noting that judicial salaries "became a matter of legislative
caprice" under the early state constitutions).
144. F. McDONALD, supra note 22, at 85.
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Common Sense. 145 Indeed, the drafters of the Massachusdtts, Delaware, and

Maryland Constitutions expressly adopted this competing egalitarian theory of
natural law. Both the Delaware and Maryland Constitutions provided that "the
right in the people to participate in the Legislature" is the "foundation" of "all
free government"; 146 the Massachusetts Constitution provided that "[a]ll power
residing originally in the people, and being derived from them, the several mag-

istrates and officers of government, vested with authority, whether legislative,
executive, or judicial, are their substitutes and agents, and are at all times accountable to them." 147

To implement egalitarian natural law theory, the early state constitutions
endowed legislatures-the democratic institutions through which the people
participated in government-with expansive powers and then established measures, such as entitling the people to give their legislative representatives legally

binding instructions, to ensure that these representatives carried out the people's
wishes. 148 Most early state constitutions failed to provide any mechanism for
voiding unconstitutional laws other than the standard Whig remedy of the ballot
box and the ultimate Whig remedy of revolt. 14 9 Moreover, the few state consti-

tutions that did create such mechanisms did not use judicial review.' 50
Both the 1776 Pennsylvania and Vermont Constitutions, for example, established a Council of Censors, which would be elected periodically by the people and endowed with the power to recommend legislative repeal of any laws

deemed inconsistent with these states' constitutions. 15 1 Neither constitution,
however, assigned judges a participatory role in these councils.' 52
The New York Constitution did assign judges such a role in the Council of

Revision. It authorized the Council-which was composed of at least two state
supreme court judges, the Governor, and the Chancellor-to review the consti-

tutionality of all new legislation, 153 and provided that the Council's determina145. Cf. 1 D. CHIP 22 (Vt. 1824), quoted in C.G. HAINES, supranote 24, at 70 & n.4 (Reporter
Daniel Chipman observed, in discussing Vermont's first constitution, that Vermonters for many
years regarded judicial review as anti-republican; that they consequently never entertained the idea
"that the Judiciary had any power to enquire into the constitutionality of acts of the Legislature, or
pronounce them void for any cause, or even question their validity;" and that "the framers of the
Constitution could never have intended to confer on the Courts the power of pronouncing an act of
the Legislature void for any cause, when they provided for an annual election of Judges by the same
Legislature who were to pass the laws.").
146. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 135, at 277 (DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 6); F.
THORPE, supra note 135, at 1890 (MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. 5).
147. F. THORPE, supra note 135, at 1890 (MAss. CONST. of 1780, art. 5).
148. Three of the 11 states adopting new constitutions-Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and
North Carolina-also adopted express constitutional language establishing the right of instruction.
W. ADAMS, supra note 90, at 248. Pennsylvania's Constitution took this right one step further by
requiring that all bills of "a public nature" must be "printed for the consideration of the people"
before they became law. F. THORPE, supra note 135, at 3086 (PA. CONST. of 1776, § 15).
149. See W. ADAMS, supra note 90, at 244; G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 162-73.
150. See W. ADAMS, supra note 90, at 269-70.
151. See C.G. HAINES, supranote 24, at 73-82; F. THORPE, supra note 135, at 3091 (PA. CONST.
of 1776, § 47); id. at 3769 (VT. CONST. of 1777, § 35); G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 339.
152. See C.G. HAINES, supra note 24, at 73-82.
153. See W. ADAMS, supra note 90, at 268; F. THORPE, supra note 135, at 2628-29 (N.Y.
CONST. of 1777, § 3).
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tions could be overturned only by a two-thirds majority of both legislative
houses. 154 But even this constitution, which endowed the judiciary with more
power than any other early state constitutions, 155 did not grant judges the independent power to render conclusive decisions concerning the constitutionality
of legislation.
Far from embodying Cokean theory, then, the early state constitutions underscored their drafters' unwillingness to cast judges in the role of guarding constitutional order, even though the drafters clearly were aware that legislatures
156
might violate their respective constitutions.
B.

Early Precedents for Judicial Review

Sherry adduces additional support for her thesis that evolving American
constitutional theory supported noninterpretivist judicial review from the few
cases in which state courts evaluated the constitutionality of legislation during
the Articles of Confederation era. Sherry contends that in six of the seven cases
she surveys, judges adhered to the dichotomy between constitutionally established positive rights and constitutionally declared natural rights, and that the
seventh case did not mark a true departure from the dichotomy. 157 Accordingly, she contends that when the issue before these courts implicated governmental powers or structure, judges confined their review of legislation to
evaluating its consistency with express constitutional terms.1 58 Conversely, she
contends that, when the issue involved fundamental natural law rights, judges
exhibited "characteristic indifference to whether the fundamental law cited [was]
in the written constitution or unwritten natural law." 1 59 Based on these cases
purportedly applying a Cokean natural law theory, Sherry reaches the sweeping
conclusion that "[i]t is thus unsurprising that in 1787 the men in Philadelphia
could uniformly assume that the federal courts would exercise the power ofjudi16°
cial review, although a few disapproved of the practice."
Sherry's thesis is problematic because it suggests that these cases evince a
coherent theory of judicial review in which judges would confine their interpretation to express constitutional terms when the issue involved governmental
structure or powers, and would consult unwritten natural law freely when faced
with questions involving individual rights. So little information is available
154. See W. ADAMS, supra note 90, at 268; C.G. HAINES, supra note 24, at 82-83; F. THORPE,
supra note 135, at 2628-29 (N.Y. CONST. of 1777, § 3).

155. See W. ADAMS, supra note 90, at 268.
156. In this regard, Adams has observed:
The authors of the early constitutions were fully aware that unconstitutional laws might
well win the approval of the legislature ...

But the two methods they devised for meeting

this danger were not based on faith that the judiciary would have the ability, integrity, and
authority to recognize such laws and annul them. The methods were based instead on the
belief in the value of a delaying veto, if not of an absolute one, and in the necessity for
periodic review and revision of the constitution.
Id. at 269-70.
157. See Sherry, supra note 11, at 1135-36.
158. See id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1129.
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about three of the cases upon which she relies-the unreported case of Holmes v.
Walton, 16 1 a series of unreported New Hampshire cases known colloquially as
the "Ten-Pound Act" cases 162 and the Symsbury Case 6 3 -that one could manipulate them to fit any interpretation. Sherry herself concedes that the information about these cases is "sparse,"' 16 but then molds them to fit her theory by
engaging in highly speculative conjecturing. In discussing Holmes, for example,
she admits that the case, "standing alone... might not prove much," but contends that, "in the context of the other state cases," it "suggests that in New
Jersey, as in other states, fundamental law was derived from more than a written
1 65
constitution."
Sherry's thesis is also problematic because two cases-the records of which
do permit an informed interpretation--conflict with the interpretation she advances. The first of these cases is the 1787 case of Bayard v. Singleton 16 6 decided by the North Carolina Superior Court.
The Bayard court relied exclusively on the express terms of North Carolina's Constitution in voiding a statute that violated a constitutional provision
guaranteeing the right to a jury trial. The court ruled that "by the constitution
every citizen had undoubtedly a right to a decision of his property by a trial by
jury."1 67 Given that the right to ajury trial implicates an individual rights ques-

tion and not a governmental structure question, the court should not, according
to Sherry's formulation, have limited its review of the offending statute to the
text of North Carolina's Constitution.
Sherry herself concedes that the Bayard court failed to consult unwritten
natural law when it ostensibly should have done so, 168 but attempts to harmonize the case with her thesis. She contends that Bayard did not truly deviate
from this thesis. She relies on a letter written by James Iredell, plaintiff's counsel in Bayard, to Richard Spaight, a fellow North Carolinian and member of the
Federal Convention who condemned the decision.1 69 In his letter, Iredell de161. Holmes v. Walton (N.J. 1780). See generally Scott, Holmes v. Walton: The New Jersey
Precedent,4 AM. HIsT. REv. 456, 456-60 (1899) (describing the case); see also C.G. HAINES, supra
note 24, at 92-95 (criticizing Professor Scott's interpretation of Holmes).
162. The "Ten-Pound Act" cases, described in 2 W.W. CROSSKEY, POLMCS AND THE CONSnTTUTION 969-71 (1953).
163. 1 Kirby 444 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1785). Of these three cases, only Symsbury was reported.
Regarding Symsbury, Sherry concedes that neither the majority opinion nor the dissenting opinion
"referred to any fundamental law" in concluding that "'[t]he act of the general assembly,"' which
had granted title to a new group of grantees, "'could not legally operate to curtail the land before
granted to the [earlier grantees], without their consent.'" Sherry, supra note 11, at 1142 (quoting
Symsbury, 1 Kirby at 447). Thus, while Sherry may be right in surmising that the Symsbury judges
"were relying on the unwritten rights of man," id. at 1142, the judges failed to explain the basis for
their opinion.
164. Sherry, supra note 11, at 1141; see id. at 1142.
165. Id. at 1141.

166.
167.
168.
169.

1 N.C. (Mart.) 15 (1787).
Id. at 17.
See Sherry, supra note 11, at 1143.
Letter from James Iredell to Richard Dobbs Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787), reprinted in 2 G.
McREE, THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 171-73 (1857) [hereinafter Iredell
Letter].

Spaight's objections to Bayard reflected his acceptance of the doctrine of legislative supremacy
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fended the practice of judicial review and made the following observation:

Without an express Constitution the powers of the Legislature would
undoubtedly have been absolute (as the Parliament in Great Britain is
held to be), and any act passed not inconsistent with natural justice
(for that curb is avowed by 170
even the judges in England), would have
been binding on the people.
From this observation, Sherry concludes that, "[iun 1787, Iredell clearly viewed

a written constitution as supplementing natural law rather than as replacing it
with a single instrument."' 17 1 Even assuming that Sherry correctly reads him,

Iredell, as the plaintiff's attorney, could not speak for the North Carolina Superior Court Judges Ashe, Williams, and Spencer who decided Bayard. Conse-

quently, Iredell's purported recognition of the Cokean natural law doctrine
justifying noninterpretivist judicial review cannot transform these judges' refusal
to employ that doctrine into acceptance of the doctrine.
Nor was the judges' decision in Bayard a fluke. In the subsequent case of
State v.(unnamed),172 Judge Williams again failed to employ Cokean natural

law doctrine in a case appraising the constitutionality of a statute authorizing
North Carolina's Attorney General to enter default judgments against debtordefendants without providing prior notice. 173 Judge Williams looked only to
two express constitutional terms: Article XII of North Carolina's Bill of Rights,
which provided that free men could be deprived of their liberties and property
only by "the law of the land;" and article XIV of the Bill of Rights, which
guaranteed the right of jury trial. 174 In ruling that the statute was unconstitutional, Judge Williams unequivocally indicated that the constitutionality of legis-

lation should be assessed only by the express limits on governmental power
prescribed in North Carolina's Constitution:

[S]uch an act made by the General Assembly, who are deputed only to
often advanced by proponents of the egalitarian theory of natural law. In his letter of protest to
Iredell, Spaight contended:
I do not pretend to vindicate the law, which has been the subject of controversy: it is
immaterial what law they have declared void; it is their usurpation of authority to do it,
that I complain of, as I do most positively deny that they have any such power; nor can
they find any thing in the Constitution, either directly or impliedly, that will support them,
or give them any color of right to exercise that authority. Besides, it would have been
absurd, and contrary to the practice of all the world had the Constitution vested such
power in them, as they would have operatedas an absolutenegative on the proceedingsof the
Legislature, which no judiciary ought ever to possess: and the State, instead of being governed by the representativesin the general Assembly, would be subject to the will of three
individuals, who united in their own persons the legislative andjudiciarypowers, which no
monarch in Europe enjoys, and which would be more despotic than the Roman Decemvirate, and equally insufferable.
Letter from Richard Dobbs Spaight to James Iredell (Aug. 12, 1787) (emphasis added), reprintedin
2 G. McRlF, supra, at 169-70. Spaight maintained that "though the assembly have no right to
violate the constitution, yet if they do so, the only remedy is either by an humble petition that the
law may be repealed, or a universal resistance of the people." Id., reprintedin 2 G. McREE, supra,
at 170.
170. Iredell Letter, supra note 169, at 172 (emphasis omitted).
171. Sherry, supra note 11, at 1143.
172. 2 N.C. (Mart.) 50 (1794).
173. Id. at 50-51.
174. Id. at 50.
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make laws in conformity to the constitution, and within the limits it
prescribes, is not any law at all. Whenever the Assembly exceeds the

limits of the Constitution, they act without authority, and then their

acts are no more binding than the acts of any other assembled body. 175
Because the case involved individual rights rather than governmental powers,

the judge should have consulted unwritten natural law under Sherry's formulation of Cokean natural law doctrine.
Furthermore, Sherry most likely reads Iredell incorrectly. During the same

month in which Iredell wrote the letter to Spaight to which Sherry attaches so
much significance, Iredell also wrote a letter to the public unequivocally explaining that the people's adoption of a written constitution establishing "the fundamental and unrepealable law" was what made the practice of judicial review
both legitimate and necessary. 176 Iredell asserted that judicial review was "unavoidable" because the Constitution was not a "mere imaginary thing, about
which ten different opinions may be formed, but a written document to which all
may have recourse, and to which, therefore, the judges cannot willfully blind
themselves."

' 177

When Iredell was appointed to the federal bench, he consistently adhered to
a textualist conception of judicial review. He accordingly resolved individual
rights cases by specifically rejecting the Cokean premise that judges might void

legislation on the basis of unwritten natural law. In the 1798 case Minge v.
Gilmour,178 for example, Iredell, sitting as federal circuit court judge, considered the question whether North Carolina's constitutional prohibition on passing ex post facto laws encompassed civil as well as criminal laws. In
determining that the express terms of North Carolina's Constitution and Bill of
Rights did not encompass ex post facto civil laws, Iredell considered whether
Cokean theory might warrant voiding the statute at issue, stating:
The words "against natural justice" are very loose terms, upon which
very wise and upright members of the legislature and judges might
differ in opinion. If they did, whose opinion is properly to be regarded-those to whom the authority of passing such an act is given,
17 9
or a court to whom no authority, in this respect necessarily results?
Iredell answered the question he posed by contending that the legislature, not
the judiciary, possessed the authority to make the policy decision that a statute
violated natural law:
[I]f the words [of a statute] are too plain to admit of more than one
construction, and the provisions be not inconsistent with any articles
of the constitution, I am of opinion,.. that no court has authority to
say the act is void because in their opinion it is not agreeable to the
175. Id. at 51-52 (emphasis added). The superior court, however, subsequently rejected Williams's preliminary ruling because Judges Ashe and MacCay, for undisclosed reasons, ruled that the
statute was constitutional. See id. at 59.
176. Letter from James Iredell to the Public (Aug. 17, 1786), reprinted in 2 G. McREE, supra
note 169, at 148.
177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. 17 F. Cas. 440, 443 (C.C.D.N.C. 1798) (No. 9631).
179. Id. at 444.
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principles of natural justice.180
In the 1798 case, Calder v. Bull,18 1 this time sitting as a Supreme Court
Justice, Iredell again flatly rejected any judicial power to enforce unwritten natural law in considering whether a Connecticut law violated the ex post facto
clause of the federal Constitution. He ruled:
If... the Legislature of the Union, or the Legislature of any member
of the Union, shall pass a law, within the general scope of their consti-

tutional power, the Court cannotpronounce it to be void merely because
it is, in theirjudgment, contrary to the principlesof naturaljustice. The
ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard; the ablest
and the purest men have differed upon the subject; and all that the
Court could properly say, in such an event, would be, that the Legislature, (possessed of an equal right of opinion,) had passed an act which,
in the opinion of the judges,
was inconsistent with the abstract princi18 2
ples of natural justice.
Common sense dictates that, in attempting to divine Iredell's position concerning noninterpretivist review of legislation, one ought to accord his reasoned
opinions as a jurist greater weight than an isolated remark made in the course of
a single letter. When one focuses on his reasoned opinions, it is clear that Iredell
firmly and consistently opposed noninterpretivist judicial review.
The second case failing to support Sherry's thesis is the 1782 Virginia case
of Commonwealth v. Caton. 8 3 Because the ease involved the governmental
structure issue of whether the Virginia Constitution permitted the House of Delegates to grant pardons without the consent of the Senate, Sherry reasons that
the Caton judges should have considered the constitutionality of the resolution
granting the pardon only by evaluating express constitutional terms. 18 4 She accordingly contends that Judge Wythe's adherence to an express interpretive
scheme renders Caton consistent with her thesis.185 Conversely, Sherry reasons
that Judge Wythe's commitment to a textual interpretation in this governmental
structure case would not have precluded him from engaging in noninterpretivist
18 6
review of legislation in an individual rights case.
180. Id.
181. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398 (1798).
182. Id. at 399 (emphasis added). In support of Sherry's interpretation, Justice Chase appar-

ently adopted the converse position, maintaining that courts should invalidate all statutes "contrary

to the great first principles of the social compact." Id. at 388. There are also other cases Sherry does
not cite in which courts reviewed legislation on the basis of unwritten natural law. See, eg.,
Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1795); Bowman v. Middleton, I S.C.L. (I Bay)
252 (1791). What is problematic about Sherry's analysis is not her claim that some courts applied
Cokean natural law theory and engaged in noninterpretivist review-though Rutgers, Bayard, and
Caton do not provide support for that practice-but her claim that the courts had so consistently
employed this type of review of legislation that it had become an accepted practice. There is ample
historical support for the former claim, but no historical support for the latter claim.
183. 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782).
184. See Sherry, supra note 11, at 1144-45.

185. See id.; Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 8. The judge ruled that whenever the legislature "should
attempt to overleap the bounds, prescribed to them by the people, I....

pointing to the constitution,

will say, to them, here is the limit of your authority; and, hither, shall you go, but no further." Id.
186. See Sherry, supra note 11, at 1145.
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Given Judge Wythe's failure to express an opinion about the propriety of
noninterpretivist judicial review, one can only speculate about his views on this
subject. Judge Wythe's colleague, Judge Edmund Pendleton, however, did ex-

press an opinion on the subject. Foreshadowing Iredell's position in Minge and
Calder, and contradicting Sherry's interpretation of Caton, Judge Pendleton
condemned Cokean natural theory and the practice of noninterpretivist review

founded upon it:
We find the same author, "L[or]d Coke, .. . asserting at one time the
omnipotence of Parliament, who may change even the Consti[tu]tion,

& [at] another exalting the Judiciary above them, giving Courts power
of declaring Acts of Parliament void because they are impertinent or
contrary to right and Reason, both of which are mere speculative opin-

ions... & neither 1of
them worthy of adoption by the [Virginia] legisla87
ture or Judiciary.

Perhaps consistently with this rejection of Cokean theory, Judge Pendleton
also expressed some doubt about the scope of the judiciary's powers to void even

legislation violating express constitutional terms:
[H]ow far this court, in whom the judiciary powers may in some sort
be said to be concentrated, shall have the power to declare the nullity

of a law passed in its forms by the legislative power, without exercising
the power of that branch, contrary to the plain terms ofthe constitution,
is indeed a deep, and I will add, a tremendous question ....188
187. 2 W.W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 959 (1953). The Caton court did
not publish an opinion when it decided the case in 1782. In 1827, however, Daniel Call prepared a
report of the case. 1 J.GOEBEL, supra note 143, at 126. Although Call used Pendleton's notes in
drafting the report, Call omitted this passage criticizing Coke from the published decision. See 2
W.W. CROSSKEY, supra, at 959. Crosskey suggests that Call, an ardent advocate of judicial review,
doctored his report so that Caton would appear to provide a strong, early precedent in favor of
judicial review. See id. at 952. As further evidence of such doctoring, Crosskey points to the disparity between Judge Pendleton's memorandum of the case and Call's report. Pendleton's memorandum indicates that five of the eight judges deciding Caton refused to rule on the question whether
they possessed the power to void legislation. See id. at 958. However, Call's report indicated that
only Pendleton passed on this question. See Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 20.

188. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 17 (emphasis added). Crosskey reads Pendleton as asserting that
judges should only review a particular statute if "the law invaded the prerogatives of the judiciary
itself, as these were established by the constitution" and that "[i]n
other cases, the interpretation of
the powers of the legislature was not.., the judiciary's concern." 2 W.W.CRossKmY, supra note
187, at 955.
Just before he framed the question quoted in the text, Judge Pendleton stated that the case
involved the issue "whether, if the constitution of government and the act declaring what shall be
treason are at variance on this subject, which shall prevail and be the rule ofjudgment?" Caton, 8
Va. (4 Call) at 17 (emphasis added). Because the judge used the phrase "the constitution of government," Sherry contends that he was alluding to the dual conception of a constitution in which that
instrument positively created or "constituted" a form of government but merely declared preexisting
natural rights. See Sherry, supra note 11, at 1145. Sherry consequently concludes that Judge Pendleton's view was consistent "with Judge Wythe's framing of the issue ...and suggests that Judge
Pendleton might have viewed the written constitution as most relevant in cases involving the structure of government." Id. Pendleton's specific rejection of Cokean theory, however, refutes Sherry's
conclusion. See supra note 187 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 286-89 and accompanying text (Pendleton identifying judicial review as being based on enforcing express constitutional
terms during the Virginia convention's deliberations on ratifying the federal Constitution). Moreover, the uncertainty Pendieton professed about the judiciary's constitutional power to encroach
upon the legislature's constitutionally established authority over legislation-professed immediately
after articulating the phrase to which Sherry attaches such significance-indicates that his concern
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Judge Pendleton then ducked this "question" by determining that the House of
18 9
Delegates resolution under consideration was constitutional.
Pendleton was not the only judge on the eight-judge Caton panel who expressed doubts about the judiciary's authority to review legislation. Judge Lyons, in fact, stated that no such authority existed. 1 90
The Caton case, thus, fails to constitute a clear precedent for interpretivist
review of legislation, and the case constitutes no precedent for noninterpretivist
review. Judge Pendleton, the only judge to discuss the latter practice, expressly
repudiated it.
Rutgers v. Waddington, 19 1 the third case upon which Sherry relies, also fails
to provide a clear precedent for the practice ofjudicial review. In this case, the
court ruled that, contrary to the plain language of the New York trespass statute, the plaintiff was not entitled to bring a trespass action against a British
citizen who occupied her property during the revolutionary war.' 92 Sherry suggests that Rutgers was consistent with the Cokean natural law tradition because
the court characterized Hamilton as asserting that the 1783 trespass statute
under which
his client was charged was "against law and reason" and therefore
"void." 193
In writing the opinion for the Rutgers court, however, Judge Duane did not

rely on Hamilton's broad argument. Judge Duane stated:
The supremacy of the Legislature need not be called into question; if
they think fit positively to enact a law, there is no power which can
controul them. When the main object of such a law is clearly ex-

pressed, and the intention manifest, the Judges are not at liberty, altho'
it appears to them to be unreasonable, to reject it: for this were to set
the judicial above the legislative, which would be subversive of all
194
government.

Nonetheless, he also stated that when the legislature enacts a statute containing
general language that produces an "unreasonable" result in a particular case,
"the Judges are in decency to conclude, that the consequences were not foreseen

by the Legislature; and therefore they are at liberty to expound the statute by
equity, and only quoad hoc to disregard it."195 Judge Duane reasoned that
"[w]hen the judicial makes these distinctions, they do not controul the Legislainvolved the express limitations Virginia's Constitution imposed upon all three branches of government, not any purported distinction between the sources that judges may consult in enforcing natural law and in upholding positive rights.
189. See Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 18, 20.
190. Moreover, Judge Dandridge "declined the question," and Judge Blair, who subsequently
would be appointed to the Supreme Court "waved [sic] the question." I J. GOEBEL, supra note 143,
at 127.
191. N.Y. City Mayor's Ct. (1784), reprintedin J. GOEBEL, THE LAW PRACTrc- OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCUMENTs AND COMMENTARY 393-419 (1964).

192. Sherry, supra note 11, at 1136.
193. Id. at 1138 (quoting J. GOEBEL, supra note 191, at 395).
194. G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 458 (emphasis in original) (quoting J. GOEBEL, supra note 191,
at 415).
195. Id. at 458 (emphasis in original).
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ture; they endeavor to give their intention it's [sic] proper effect." 19 6

Judge Duane thus rejected the premise that judges possess the power to
invalidate unambiguouslegislation conflicting with express constitutional terms;
he asserted that judges possess only the limited power to interpret ambiguous
legislation to avoid unreasonable results. 197 Judge Duane certainly did not assert that judges possessed the much more far-reaching power to invalidate un-

ambiguous legislation on the basis of unwritten natural law.
In asserting that pre-1787 state courts legitimized the practice of judicial

review, Sherry also inexplicably glosses over the violent controversy sparked by
Rutgers and Trevett v. Weeden, 198 the final case upon which she relies. As
Sherry indicates, the defendant in Trevett was charged with violating a Rhode

Island statute requiring merchants to accept paper money and was brought
before the superior court pursuant to the statutory requirement that violators be
tried by special courts sitting without juries. 199 The Trevett court, however, refused to decide the case, instead ruling "that the said Complaint does not come
' '2 ° °
under the Cognizance of the Justices here present.
In discussing Trevett, Sherry does note that the judges who decided Trevett
were "called before the [Rhode Island] legislature to explain their actions. ' 20 1
What she fails to note is that the Rhode Island legislature in fact fired all of the
judges involved in Trevett except the Chief Justice, who prudently stated no rea-

sons for his decision.202
Sherry also underplays the equally pronounced opposition that Rutgers provoked when the Mayor's Court for the City of New York decided it.203
196. Id. (emphasis in original).
197. Id. at 458-59; 1 J. GOEBEL, supra note 143, at 135-36.
198. The unpublished decision of Trevett v. Weeden is described in J. VARNUM, THE CASE;
TREVETT AGAINST WEEDEN: ON INFORMATION AND COMPLAINT FOR REFUSING PAPER BILLS IN
PAYMENT FOR BUTCHER'S MEAT, IN MARKET, AT PAR WITH SPECIE (1787).

199. Sherry, supra note 11, at 1138; see 1 J. GOEBEL, supra note 143, at 136-37.
200. 1 J. GOEBEL, supra note 143, at 140 (quoting 1786 R.I. Acts & Resolves 5-6). The basis
upon which the Trevett court reached its decision is difficult to discern. The Trevett court did not
publish an opinion, and the unofficial record of the case, composed by James Varum, who served as
defendant's counsel, contains only Varum's argument and the court's judgment. Id. at 138. While
Sherry rightly notes that Varum employed a Cokean natural law theory in arguing that the paper
money statute under which his client was tried was void, see Sherry, supra note 11, at 1139-40, it is
far from clear whether the court relied upon Cokean theory in dismissing the case. See 1 J. GOEBEL,
supra note 143, at 140. As noted above, the court apparently stated only "that the said Complaint"
is not cognizable. Id. (quoting 1787 R.I. Acts & Resolves 5-6).
201. Sherry, supra note 11, at 1139.
202. See C.G. HAINES, supra note 24, at 111; 1 J. GOEBEL, supranote 143, at 14. Julius Goebel
offers a slightly different account of events. He contends that the legislature, after considerable
deliberation, did not impeach the Trevett judges, but that, with the exception of the Chief Justice, all
of these judges lost their seats on the court in the next election. Id. at 141. Whether the people
refused to re-elect the judges or the legislature fired them, the inhabitants of Rhode Island clearly did
not regard judicial review as a legitimate practice.
Sherry also fails to note that the North Carolina General Assembly attempted to sanction the
judges deciding Bayard when they first refused to honor the Assembly's request to dismiss the case.
See 2 W.W. CROSSKEY, supra note 187, at 971. That attempt ultimately was abandoned after the
Assembly determined that the judges had not breached the duties of their office. See id. (citing N.C.
State Records XVIII, 42, 215-17, 428-29).
203. In one cryptic sentence, Sherry concedes that the "public and legislative uproar" following
Rutgers was "inevitable." Sherry, supra note 11, at 1138. Yet she seemingly argues that this uproar
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Although the New York Legislature did not actually fire the Rutgers judges, it
successfully intimidated them into submission by passing resolutions denouncing
their conduct. 2° 4 The profound opposition that these cases provoked casts considerable doubt upon Sherry's conclusion that judicial review based upon express constitutional terms had become an accepted practice by the time the
Federal Convention convened in Philadelphia.
The public opposition to Trevett and Rutgers also undermines Sherry's conclusion that noninterpretivist judicial review was an accepted component of
American constitutional theory. In response to Rutgers, angry citizens published a letter in the New York Packet and American Advertiser vehemently denouncing the decision as a flagrant judicial usurpation of power and contending
that "[t]he design of Courts of Justice, in our Government, from the very nature
of their institution, is to declare laws, not to alter them. '20 5 Another critic of
the decision asserted that permitting courts to void legislation would lead inexorably to the destruction of the people's hard-won liberties:
[If they [I e., judges] are to be invested with apower to overrule a plain
law, though expressed in general words, as all general laws are and
must be; when they may judge the law unreasonable, because not consonant to the law of nations or to the opinions of ancient or modern
civilians andphilosophers;for whom they may have a greater veneration
than for the solid statutes and supreme legislative power of the state;
we say, if they are to assume and exercise such a power, the probable
consequences of their independence will be the most deplorable and
wretched dependency of the people. That the laws should be no longer
absolute, would be in itself a great evil; but far more dreadful consequence arises,for that power is not lost in the controversy,
but trans20 6
ferred to judges who are independent of the people.
The New York legislature echoed this theme, passing a resolution in which
it suggested that the Rutgers court should be removed from office and alleging:
[T]he adjudication aforesaid is, in its tendency, subversive of all law
and good order, and leads directly to anarchy and confusion, because if
a court instituted for the benefit and government of a corporation may
take upon them to dispense with, and act in a direct violation of a plain
and known law of the state, all other courts either superior or inferior,
may do like; and therewith will end all our dear-bought rights, and
does not undermine her thesis because it was not directed "at the court's use of the law of nations
[and the natural law principles incorporated therein], but at its exercise of judicial review at all." Id.
This argument does nothing to lessen the significance of the public's reaction to Rutgers: by objecting to all forms of judicial review, the people obviously also were objecting to noninterpretivist
review.
204. See I J. GOEBEL, supra note 143, at 137; C.G. HAINES, supra note 24, at 101-04; F. McDONALD, supra note 22, at 156.
205. G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 459 (quoting New York Packet & American Advertiser, Nov. 4,
1784). One signer of this letter was Melancton Smith, who would prove to be one of Hamilton's
most formidable adversaries during the New York ratifying convention. I J. GOEBEL, supra note
143, at 137 n.199; see infra notes 357-58, 362 and accompanying texts.
206. H. DAwSoN, THE CASE OF ELIZABETH RUTGERS VERSUS JOSHUA WADDINGTON
XXXVI (1866) (emphasis added), quoted in C.G. HAINES, supra note 24, at 102-03.
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privileges and legislatures become useless. 20 7
The Rhode Island Legislature similarly denounced the Trevett decision, passing
a resolution asserting that "the judgment is unprecedented and may tend directly to abolish the legislative authority. ' 208 These arguments again underscore the primacy of the egalitarian theory of natural law in early American
thought and the concomitant distrust with which many Americans viewed the
undemocratic institution of the judiciary.
III. NaturalLaw, JudicialReview, and the State Ratifying Conventions
In discussing the Federal Convention, Sherry observes that an important
shift occurred with the proposal to present the new federal constitution to the
state conventions chosen by the people for popular ratification, rather than submitting it to the state legislatures. She notes that this proposal was fueled in part
by pragmatic considerations. These considerations included the awareness that
state legislators, who would be divested of considerable power if the Constitution were adopted, would be less likely to ratify it than would conventions
drawn directly from the people.2° 9 She also contends, however, that "[t]hose in
favor of popular ratification had grasped a crucial theory ... to justify what had
begun as a purely practical mechanism. ' 210 This theory, she maintains, departed from the earlier view that a written constitution could only declare preexisting fundamental law. It posited that such a constitution could create its own
species of positive fundamental law "specifically because it had been enacted by
'21 1
the people."
Having accurately characterized the theory of popular ratification, however, Sherry ignores the correlation between this theory and the egalitarian natural law principle establishing that law becomes binding solely because of the
people's consent. She thereby glosses over the profound conflict between this

theory of popular ratification and the Cokean practice of noninterpretivist judi-

cial review.2 12 In engaging in interpretivist review, judges do not violate the
central premise of this theory that the Constitution establishes the overarching
law because the people enacted it. In these instances, judges only enforce the
207. H. DAwsoN, supra note 206, at xli-xlii, quoted in C.G. HAINES, supra note 24, at 102-03.
208. C.G. HAINES, supra note 24, at 103 (quoting 1786-87 R.I. Acts and Resolves 61).

209. See Sherry, supranote 11, at 1151-54. Madison, for example, "considered it best to require
Conventions, among other reasons, for this, that the powers given to the Gen[eral] Gov[ernment]
being taken from the State Gov[ermnents] the [State] Legislatures would be more disinclined...
they could devise modes apparently promoting, but really, thwarting the ratification." J. MADISON,
NOTES OF DEBATES INTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 563 (A. Koch ed. 1966) [hereinafter MADISON'S NOTES].

210. Sherry, supra note 11, at 1151.
211. Id. at 1154. Madison, for example, argued: "The people were, in fact, the foundation of all
power, and by resorting to them, all difficulties were got over. They could alter constitutions as they
pleased." MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 209, at 564, quoted in Sherry, supra note 11, at 1151.
212. Sherry does obliquely acknowledge this conflict by asserting that "[a]ny conflict between
popular sovereignty and natural law was, at least until the mid-1790s more apparent than real, since
'the Revolutionary generation, believing in people's inherent goodness, simply assumed that all laws

made by the people would be consistent with fundamental rights."' Sherry, supra note 11, at 1156
n.132 (quoting Nelson, The Eighteenth Century Background ofJohn Marshall'sConstitutionalJuris-

prudence, 76 MicH. L. REv 893, 928 (1978)).
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written terms of the Constitution that the people chose to adopt as positive law.

In engaging in noninterpretivist review, however, judges do violate this premise.
In these instances, they create new fundamental law neither contained in the
213
Constitution nor adopted by the people.
Sherry does not overstate the importance of the new theory of popular rati-

fication adopted by the framers of the Constitution. This theory proved to be a
successful weapon against Antifederalist charges that the Philadelphia Convention wrongfully exceeded its powers by abrogating the Articles of Confederation
and creating the new federal Constitution. 2 14 Faced with such charges during
the state ratifying conventions, proponents of the new Constitution hammered

home the point that the Constitution was merely a proposal that could acquire
legal force only if adopted by the people. During the Pennsylvania Convention,
for example, James Wilson asserted:
[T]he late Convention have done nothing beyond their powers. The
fact is, they have exercised no power at all. And in point of validity,
this Constitution proposed by them for the government of the United

States, claims no more than a production of the same nature would
claim, flowing from a private pen. It is laid before the citizens of the
United States, unfettered by restraint; it is laid before them to be
213. Cf Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution in American Revolutionary Thought, 30
STAN. L. REV. 843, 893 (1978) (conceding that "it remains to be shown" that the Federalists' adoption and exploitation of the theory of popular ratification "was consistent with [the] acceptance of
noninterpretive judicial review").
214. As Sherry notes, the opponents of the new Constitution began to dispute the Federal Convention's authority to draft the instrument soon after the Convention began. Five days after all of
the delegates finally arrived in Philadelphia, for example, General Charles Pinkney asserted that he
doubted "whether the act of Cong[ress] recommending the Convention, or the Commissions of the
Deputies to it, could authorise a discussion of a System founded on different principles from the

federal Constitution." MADISON'S NoTEs, supra note 209, at 35 (May 30, 1787). Opponents of the
Constitution continued this dispute throughout the state ratifying conventions. See, e.g., 4 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTrru-

24, 290 (J. Elliot rev. ed. 1866) [hereinafter ELLIOT's DEBATES] (Joseph Taylor, in the North
Carolina convention, asserting that the Convention "assumed more power than was given them");
id. at 290 (Rowlins Lowndes, in the South Carolina convention, asserting he "could not understand
with what propriety the [Federal] Convention proceeded to change the Confederation; for every
person with whom he had conversed on the subject concurred in opinion that the sole object of
appointing a convention was to inquire what alterations were necessary in the Confederation"); see
also 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALiST 7, 108 (H. Storing ed. 1981) [hereinafter ANTrFEDERAL1ST] (Elbridge Gerry opposing the Constitution in an Oct. 18, 1787 letter read to the New York
Legislature, and asserting, inter alia, that the Federal Convention's powers did not "extend[] to the
formation of the plan proposed"); id. at 108 ("Cato's" letter asserting that "[t]his Convention have
exceeded the authority given to them, and have transmitted to Congress a new political fabric, essentially and fundamentally distinct and different from it").
Perhaps more importantly, the theory of popular ratification enabled proponents of the new
Constitution to rebut the Antifederalist charge that the national government would consume the
state governments because the indivisible nature of sovereignty conflicted with the maintenance of
concurrent sovereignties. The Antifederalists insisted that this characteristic of sovereignty dictated
that either the national or state governments must be supreme, arguing that "two co-ordinate sovereignties would be a solecism in politics[ ]" and that "it would be contrary to the nature of things that
both should exist together-one or the other would necessarily triumph in the fullness of dominion."
G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 528 (quoting an unidentified Pennsylvania Antifederalist). The Federalists' argument that the people, not their servants in the state legislature, possessed this indivisible
sovereignty deprived the Antifederalists' objection of any real force. For a particularly powerful
refutation of this objection, see James Wilson's remarks during the Pennsylvania ratifying conventions. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra, at 455-57.
TION
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judged by the natural, civil, and political rights of men. By their
FIAT, it will become of value and authority; without it, it will never
receive the character of authenticity and power.215
North Carolina supporters of the Constitution echoed Wilson, although
they ultimately failed to procure ratification. In arguing that the Federal Convention had not exceeded its authority, Archibald MacClaine asserted:
The Constitution is only a mere proposal. Had it been binding on us,
there might be reason for objecting. After they [i.e. the Federal Convention] had finished the plan, they proposed that it should be recommended to the people by the several state legislatures. If the people
approve of it, it becomes their
act.... It is no more than a blank till it
216
be adopted by the people.
William R. Davie similarly asserted that the Constitution would either "remain
a dead letter, or receive its operation from the fiat of this [ratifying]
'217
Convention.
Writing as "Publius" in letters later published as The Federalist, James
Madison offered the Rew York ratifying convention similar assurances. 218 He
maintained that the Federal Convention understood its role to be "merely advisory and recommendatory" and that the proposed Constitution necessarily
would be of "no more consequence than the paper on which it is written, unless
'2 19
it is stamped with the approbation of those to whom it is addressed.
Sherry rightly stresses the importance of the new theory that only popular
ratification could endow the Constitution with authority as fundamental law.
However, she then paradoxically dismisses the debates entertained in the state
conventions through which popular ratification was secured as being "essentially
irrelevant" to the question of whether the Constitution was intended to authorize judges to invalidate legislation by consulting unwritten natural law.220 This
dismissal effectively nullifies the very theoretical innovation that Sherry attributes to the triumphant proponents of popular ratification. If, as Sherry asserts,
after some initial resistance during the Federal Convention, the proposed Constitution was soon "amended... to conform to the idea of a positive law enacted
by the people," 221 then the people's understanding of the Constitution expressed
by the delegates attending the state ratifying conventions simply cannot be irrelevant to answering this question. Indeed, this idea suggests that the converse
proposition must be true: the understanding of the people who participated in
215. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RATIFICATION OF THE CoNsTrTTION 483-84 (M. Jenson
ed. 1976) (Wilson's speech in the Pennsylvania Convention on Dec. 4, 1787) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY], quoted in Lofgren, The OriginalUnderstandingof OriginalIntent?, 5 CONT. COMMENTARY 77, 83-84 (1988).
216. 4 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 214, at 24-24, quoted in Lofgren, The Original Understanding of OriginalIntent?, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 77, 84 (1988).
217. 4 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 214, at 16.
218. The writings of "Publius" were widely read by delegates attending the New York ratifying
convention. See infra note 385 and accompanying text.
219. THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 200 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
220. Sherry, supra note 11, at 1161 n.143.
221. Id. at 1154.
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the state conventions and ratified the Constitution, transforming it into positive,
fundamental law, must be highly pertinent in resolving this and other questions

of constitutional interpretation.

In surveying a wide range of historical sources, Professor Charles Lofgren
recently demonstrated that early American statesmen of both Federalist and
Antifederalist persuasion understood the implications of the popular ratification
theory. 222 He points, for example, to the 1796 controversy that arose concern-

ing whether the United States House of Representatives was constitutionally entitled to review the negotiating papers accompanying the Jay Treaty with
England. 223 During this controversy, Madison unequivocally indicated that, if
extrinsic evidence were needed for interpreting the Constitution, only the state
ratifying debates should be consulted:
As the instrument came from them [the Federal Convention] ... it was
nothing more than the draft of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until
life and validity were breathed into it by the voice of the people, speaking through the several State Conventions. If we were to look, therefore, for the meaning of the instrument beyond the face of the
instrument, we must look for it, not in the General Convention, which
proposed, but in the State Conventions, which accepted and ratified
224
the Constitution.

A number of Federalist Congressmen disagrexl with Madison's interpretation that the state ratifying conventions had believed that the House would play
a constitutional role in treaty-making. 225 Lofgren, however, notes that these
Congressmen did not dispute the interpretive validity of resorting to the ratify222. See Lofgren, The OriginalUnderstandingof OriginalIntent?, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 77,
79-113 (1988). Powell argues that the framers did not intend either their subjective understanding of
the Constitution or the subjective understanding of the delegates attending the state ratifying conventions to control constitutional interpretation. He contends that they instead intended that the
Constitution would be construed using traditional common-law techniques of statutory construction.
See generally Powell, supra note 106 (surveying historical sources). Lofgren, however, marshalls an

impressive array of historical sources demonstrating that the framers did expect that the "intent" of
the popular ratifying conventions would be consulted in interpreting the Constitution. Lofgren,
supra, at 79-117.
223. See Lofgren, supra note 222, at 94-102. This controversy developed after House Republicans demanded access to the Treaty negotiating papers and refused to allocate funds to implement
the Treaty. See id. at 94.
224. 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS col. 776 (April 6, 1796) (History of Congress ed. 1849), quoted In
Lofgren, supra note 222, at 103. For the remainder of his life, Madison consistently held the position
that the state ratifiers' intent rather than the Federal Convention's intent should be dispositive when
constitutional interpretation requires extrinsic sources. See Lofgren, supra note 222, at 103; Powell,
supra note 106, at 937. In 1821, for example, Madison wrote to Thomas Richie:
As a guide to expounding and applying the provisions of the Constitution, the debates and
incidental decisions of the [Philadelphia] Convention can have no authoritative character.
However desirable it be that they should be preserved as a gratification to the laudable
curiosity felt by every people to trace the origin and progress of their political Institutions,
& as a source perhaps of some lights on the Science of Govt.[,] the legitimate meaning of
the Instrument must be derived from the text itself; or if key is to be sought elsewhere, it
must be, not in the opinions of the body which planned & proposed the Constitution, but in
the sense attached to it by the people in their respective State Conventions where it
rec[eived] all the Authority which it possesses.
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821), quoted in Lofgren, supra note 222,
at 103.
225. By 1796, Madison, who played a nationalist role at the Federal Convention and articulated
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ing conventions' records of the state conventions. For example, Theodore
Sedgwick disputed Madison's interpretation on the ground that Madison had
never assigned a role in foreign affairs to the House during the Virginia ratification debates. 226 Sedgwick queried: "How it happened that, if such was really
the intention of the instrument, that such was the meaning of the people, no man
had heard of it until the discovery was produced by the British [Jay] Treaty.
Strange national intention, unknown for years to every individUal." 227 But
Sedgwick did not suggest that the state ratifiers' understanding was irrelevant to
discerning the House's role. To the contrary, he canvassed the Virginia ratifying
debates to demonstrate that many delegates strenuously objected to the Constitution on the ground that the Constitution denied any treaty-making powers to
228
the House.
In denying that the House possessed treaty-making powers, South Carolina
Federalist William Smith also referred to the debates in the state ratifying conventions. Smith asserted:
[Hie should not confine himself to a mere recital of the words, but he
should appeal to the general sense of the whole nation at the time the
constitution was formed .... By referring to the contemporaneous
expositions of that instrument, when the subject was viewed only in
relation to the abstract power,
and not to a particular Treaty, we
229
should come at the truth.
Benjamin Bourne likewise asserted that "[i]f a doubt existed as to what was the
true construction of the Constitution, it ought to be conformed to the opinion
230
which prevailed when the Constitution was adopted."
The theory of popular ratification adopted by the Federal Convention, as
well as the subsequent congressional endorsement of the records from the state
ratifying conventions as a uniquely valuable source for constitutional interpretation, indicate that these records are highly germane to resolving whether the
Constitution was intended to authorize judges to review legislation by consulting
unwritten natural law. Assuming that the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with its original intent and that the state convention delegates did
not understand the Constitution to authorize noninterpretivist judicial review,
this lack of understanding would suggest strongly that the Constitution cannot
231
legitimately be construed as authorizing this judicial practice.
a Federalist position in the Federalist Papers, had switched his alliance and supported many Antifederalist positions.
226. Lofgren, supra note 222, at 96.
227. 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 224, at col. 520 (March 11, 1796), quoted in Lofgren,
supra note 222, at 96.
228. See 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 224, at col. 523-28 (March 11, 1796), cited in
Lofgren, supra note 222, at 96 n.66.
229. 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 224, at col. 495 (March 10, 1796), quoted in Lofgren,
supra note 222, at 95.
230. 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 224, at col. 574 (March 11, 1796), quoted in Lofgren,
supra note 222, at 96.
231. The theory of popular ratification the delegates attending the Federal Convention endorsed
mandates that the understanding of those who ratified, and not those who drafted the Constitution,
is the most important guide to constitutional interpretation. Therefore, I focus exclusively on the
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Perhaps realizing that the debates entertained during the state ratifying
conventions must have some significant bearing on whether the Constitution was
intended to authorize judicial enforcement of unwritten natural law, Sherry
summarily asserts, without any detailed reference to the available records, that
no real dispute about this question arose during these conventions. 232 She bases
her assertion solely on the fact that the Antifederalist delegates attending the
state conventions refused to ratify the Constitution absent the addition of a federal bill of rights delineating fundamental, natural-law rights.23 3 From this fact,
she surmises that the Antifederalists' "fight with the federalists turned on issues
23 4
entirely apart from any dispute over the sources of fundamental rights."
This logic provides no justification for ignoring the substance of the state
ratifying debates. To the contrary, it reflects Sherry's recurrent confusion of two
distinct doctrinal questions: The question as to the source of individual rights;
and the question as to enforcement of those rights. As the previous discussion of
the various natural-law traditions prominent in the American colonies demonstrates, accepting the doctrine that divine or natural law confers upon man certain inalienable individual rights need not entail accepting the doctrine
empowering judges to protect those rights. By ignoring the ratification debates
on the ground that the Antifederalists believed men possessed certain fundamental rights derived from natural law, Sherry's article consequently begs the question whether the Antifederalists also believed that judges should have the
authority to override legislation to safeguard those rights.
A. Pennsylvania Ratifying Debates
The thoroughly one-sided account presented in the official record of Pennsylvania's convention-the first state to consider ratification of the new Constitution 23 5-provides very little information about the Antifederalists' views. The
Pennsylvania Federalists successfully excluded all Antifederalist commentary
2 36
from this record.
state ratifying conventions in the discussion that follows. For a compelling analysis of this point, see
Lofgren, supra note 222, at 79-113.
232. See Sherry, supra note 11, at 1161 n.143.
233. See id.
234. Id.
235. In the discussion that follows, I review in chronological order the records of the Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New York, Virginia, and North Carolina conventions because these records
provide the most detailed accounts of the debates surrounding ratification of the Constitution and
because the records of the other state ratifying conventions are fragmentary.
236. See Sherry, supra note 11, at 3. The Federalist-controlled Pennsylvania Legislature also
rushed to convene the state ratifying convention to prevent the Pennsylvania Antifederalists from
having time to organize their forces. See 3 ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 214, at 4 (Herbert Storing's
introduction to the writings of Pennsylvania Antifederalists).
The debates surrounding whether Antifederalists' objections to the proposed Constitution
should be included in the official record, however, do suggest that the Pennsylvanians attending the
ratifying convention understood that this record would have interpretive relevance in subsequent
controversies surrounding the meaning of the Constitution. Dr. Benjamin Rush, for example, contended that such objections should be excluded to prevent confusing the official record, which having
been "stamped with authenticity" would be consulted in the future. 2 DOCUMENTARY HisroRY,
supra note 215, quoted in Lofgren, supra note 222, at 92. Robert Whitehill argued for inclusion of
these objections for precisely the same reason. He contended that a complete, contemporaneous
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These official records do indicate, however, that the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention was never informed that the new Constitution would empower
judges to invalidate legislation inconsistent with unwritten natural law. James

Wilson, in an eloquent defense of the Constitution spanning more than 100
pages and constituting virtually the entire official record of the debates, 2 37 did
state that the Constitution authorized judicial review:

If a law should be made inconsistent with those powers vested by this
instrument in Congress, the judges, as a consequence of their independence, and the particular powers of government being defined, will declare such law to be null and void; for the power of the Constitution
predominates. Any thing, therefore, that shall be enacted by Congress
2 38
contrary thereto, will not have the force of law.
Wilson, however, was suggesting that the Constitution would permit judges to
invalidate federal legislation to insure that Congress did not exceed its expressly
limited constitutional powers. Wilson's statement also could suggest that the
federal judges would be permitted to invalidate state legislation encroaching
upon Congress's expressly enumerated powers or violating other express constitutional terms. But Wilson's statement in no way suggests that the Constitution
would authorize judges to invalidate either state or federal legislation based
upon natural-law principles not expressly codified in the Constitution.
Although the Pennsylvania Antifederalists were denied the opportunity to
air their views about the Constitution in the convention's official records, they
did publish an account of their reasons for refusing to ratify the Constitution in
the PennsylvaniaPacket and Daily Advertiser.2 39 This account, which advanced
24
arguments often repeated by opponents of the Constitution in other states, 0
evinced the Antifederalist authors' profound fear of what they regarded as the
dangerously expansive powers that the Constitution had conferred on the federal
record of Pennsylvania's ratifying debates would provide needed information about "the nature and
tendency of the government," and that "the people at large will acknowledge, with thanks, the
resulting information upon a subject so important to themselves and their latest prosperity." 2 DocUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 215, at 377, quoted in Lofgren, supra note 222, at 92.
237. See 2 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 214, at 422-527. The only other person whose remarks were recorded in this record was the Federalist Thomas M'Kean. See id. at 417, 529-42.
238. Id. at 489. When Wilson made this statement, he was responding to the objection of Robert
Whitehill, who subsequently voted against ratification of the Constitution, that the constitutional
"powers given to judges are dangerous." Id. The grounds for Whitehill's objection, however, cannot be discerned from the record of the debates.
239. See The Address andReasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvaniato
Their Constituents, Pa. Packet & Daily Advertiser, Dec. 18, 1787, reprintedin 3 ANTIFEDERALIST,
supra note 214, at 146-67 [hereinafter Address].
Despite their defeat at the convention, the Pennsylvania Antifederalists refused to end their
fight against the new Constitution. They continued to publish often caustic critiques of the Constitution in Pennsylvania and fueled opposition to the Constitution in other states. 3 ATIFEDERALIST,

supra note 214, at 4 (Storing's Introduction).
240. These arguments included the objection that the Federal Convention lacked the authority
to draft the Constitution; that the extensive territory of the United States could not be governed
under republican principles, except under a system of confederated, sovereign states; that the Constitution was defective because it'did not adequately separate the powers of the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches of government; that the Constitution was defective because it lacked a bill of
rights; and that the representational scheme of the Constitution was defective. See Address, supra
note 239, at 149, 153, 155, 163.
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judiciary. They contended that "the decisive influence that a general judiciary
would have over the civil polity of the several states... unaided by the [federal]

legislative, would effect a consolidation of the states under one government."2 4 1
The Antifederalists particularly objected to granting any federal court equity
jurisdiction and to granting the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over questions of both law and fact. 2 42 They believed that these jurisdictional grants
taken together gave unbounded discretion to the Supreme Court and any lower
federal courts Congress might create, which the aristocracy would exploit to
defeat the legitimate claims of the poor. "Length
of purse," they asserted, "will
'2 43
too often prevail against right and justice.
Pennsylvania Antifederalists also vehemently objected to the Constitution
on the ground that it abolished jury trials in civil suits. 244 This objection reflected the flip side of their objection to granting the federal judiciary discretion-

ary powers. For these Antifederalists, juries drawn from the common peoplenot judges drawn from the elite echelons of society and guaranteed independence from the people by virtue of possessing office during good behavior-were
the true guardians of the people's rights.245
The authors did not specifically object to the new Constitution on the

ground that it authorized judicial review. Their general objection that the federal judiciary would facilitate destruction of the state governments, as well as

their particular objection to endowing this branch of government with any discretionary powers, however, does suggest that these Antifederalists would have
opposed authorizing federal judges to invalidate state legislation contravening
241. Id. at 156-57. Other Pennsylvania Antifederalists echoed this theme. One Antifederalist
author, for example, composed a satirical essay written from Federalist perspective in which he
asserted:
[O]ur court will have original or appellate jurisdiction in all cases-and if so how fallen are
the state judicatures-and must not every provincial law yield to our supreme fiat? Our
constitution answers yes-then how insignificant will the makers of these laws be-it is in
the nature of power to create influence-and finally we shall entrench ourselves so as to
laugh at the cabals of the commonality.
Montezuma, Philadelphia Indep. Gazetteer, Oct. 17, 1787, reprinted in 3 AN'iFEDERALIST, supra
note 214, at 56.
242. Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides in pertinent part:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority....
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in
which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all
other Cases before mentioned, the [S]upreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both
as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
243. Address, supra note 239, at 160.

244. See id.
245. Other Pennsylvania Antifederalists also expressed concern that granting the federal judiciary tenure during good behavior would detach federal judges from the people and eventually result
in this judiciary's corruption. See, eg., A Federal Republican, A Review ofthe ConstitutionProposed
by the Late Convention (1787), reprinted in 3 ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 214, at 77, 79; cf. A
Farmer,Freeman's Oracle & N.H. Advertiser, Jan. 11, 1788, reprintedin 4 ANTIFEDERALISr, supra
note 214, at 206 (asserting that to "secure the liberties of the people," a jury drawn from the people
should sit with the Supreme Court).
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the Constitution. Moreover, these authors' objections clearly indicate that they
would have strenuously opposed authorizing federal judges to void legislation
based on unwritten natural law.
The constitutional amendments that a number of these Antifederalist authors drafted after the Pennsylvania convention ratified the Constitution also
suggest that they would have opposed the practice of judicial review.246 They
proposed several amendments designed to insulate the states from the federal
judiciary's interference and to abolish judicial discretion. To achieve the former
goal, they proposed amending the Constitution to prohibit Congress from establishing any federal court other than the Supreme Court, "except such as shall be
necessary for determining causes of admiralty jurisdiction, ' 247 and to preclude
the Supreme Court from hearing appeals, "except in revenue cases, unless the
matter in controversy exceed the value of three thousand dollars." 248 To
achieve the latter goal, they proposed amending the Constitution to confine the

Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to questions of law only. 249 These Antifederalists also proposed amending the Constitution to preclude all branches of
the federal government from exercising any powers except those expressly enumerated in the Constitution, with the added caveat that no "authority, power, or
jurisdiction, [shall] be assumed or exercised by the executive or judiciary depart' 250
ments of the Union, under color or pretence of construction or fiction."
These authors' attempts to restrict the federal judiciary's jurisdiction so severely and their insistence that federal judges must be expressly prohibited from
expanding the national government's powers through the guise of interpretation
suggests that they would have vigorously opposed the practice of judicial review,
a practice that the Constitution never expressly authorizes. 2 51 Because the
judges engaging in noninterpretivist review possess virtually unlimited discretion
to invalidate legislation not contravening any express constitutional term, cne
can readily surmise that these authors would have rejected this practice even
more vehemently.
Yet the Antifederalist leaders in Pennsylvania also opposed the Constitution because it contained no bill of rights delineating "those unalienable and
246. The individuals who co-authored the Address and then subsequently proposed amendments
were Robert Whitehill, John Bishop, Jonathon Hoge, John Smilie, Richard Baird, Adam Orth, and
John Andre Hannah. See Address, supra note 239, at 166.
247. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 546 (U.S. CONST. amend. II, art. III, § 1 (pro-

posed Sept. 3, 1788)).
248. Id. (U.S. CONST. amend. II, art. III, § 2 (proposed Sept. 3, 1788)).
249. Id. (U.S. CONsT. amend. II, art. III, § 2 (proposed Sept. 3, 1788)).
250. Id. at 545 (U.S. CONST. amend. I (proposed Sept. 3, 1788)).
251. The Constitution does not explicitly authorize federal judicial review, although two of its
provisions, the "arising under" clause contained in article III, § 2 and the "supremacy" clause contained in article VI, arguably grant this power by implication. See generally R. BERGER, CONGRESS
V. THE SUPREME COURT 198-284 (1969) (discussing various commentators' views concerning
whether the "arising under" and "supremacy clauses" implicitly authorize judicial review); C.G.
HAINES, supra note 24, at 122-47 (same). Because the Pennsylvania Antifederalists' amendment
would have permitted the federal courts to exercise only expressly established powers and would
have specifically proscribed employment of interpretive "fictions" or "constructions," the amend-

ment seemingly would have prevented the federal judiciary from reviewing legislation based on any
purported implicit grant of constitutional authority.
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personal rights of men."'252 These Antifederalists' characterization of certain
individual rights as "unalienable" may well support Sherry's inference that their
dispute with the Federalists did not turn upon the source of fundamental rights;

they apparently agreed with the Federalists that natural law bestowed upon people certain rights of which they could not be rightfully divested. However, these

Pennsylvania Antifederalists' profound distrust of the federal judiciary and of
judges in general does not support Sherry's additional inference that they would
have agreed with the Federalists that judges should safeguard such rights by

invalidating legislation. 25 3

B. Massachusetts Ratifying Debates
Although the Federalist delegates convinced the Massachusetts ratifying
convention to undertake a clause-by-clause examination of the new Constitution, 254 the convention entertained very little focused discussion about the federal judiciary's role in the proposed scheme of limited government. Indeed, with

one exception, all of the proponents of the Constitution who discussed the

checks it imposed upon the federal government failed to identify judicial review
as a potential check on that government's power.

James Bowdoin, for example, spoke at some length in an effort to allay
Antifederalist fears that the Constitution vested the federal government with
uncontrollable power.255 After indicating that he was providing an exhaustive

list of the constitutional checks that would prevent that government from abusing its power,25 6 he identified the following seven "great" checks: 25 7 1) the elec-

252. 3 ANrIFEDERALIST, supra note 214, at 157.
253. One anonymous Pennsylvania Antifederalist, however, did suggest that a federal bill of
rights would enable judges to play a role in safeguarding individual rights. Writing under the pseudonym "An Old Whig," the writer contended that Congress would be tyrannical "unless we had a
bill of rights to which we might appeal, and under which we might contend against any assumption
of undue power and appeal to the judicial branch of the government to protect us by their judgments." An Old Whig, Philadelphia Indep. Gazetter, Nov. 1787, reprinted in 3 ANTiFEDERALIsT,
supra note 214, at 25.
254. Because a majority of delegates opposed the Constitution when the Massachusetts convention began, the Federalists apparently feared an early vote would result in defeat and endeavored to
prolong consideration of the Constitution. 4 ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 214, at 3 (Storing's introductory description of the writings of New England Antifederalists).
255. See 2 ELuoTr's DEBATES, supra note 214, at 81-88. For Antifederalist objections that the
Constitution awarded the federal government excessive powers, see, e.g., id. at 159 (Nathaniel Barrell asserting that "Congress will be vested with more extensive powers than ever Great Britain
exercised over us; too great, in my opinion, to intrust with any class of men, let their talents or
virtues be ever so conspicuous"). Major Samuel Nason similarly asserted:
Great Britain... first attempted to enslave us, by declaring her laws supreme, and that she
had a right to bind us in all cases whatever. What... roused the Americans to shake off
the yoke preparing for them? It was this measure, the power to do which we are now about
giving to Congress.
Id. at 133.
256. Bowdoin indicated that he believed he was providing a comprehensive list of the checks
that would preclude the federal government from abusing its powers in the following passage:
[In] all delegations of importance, like the one contained in the proposed Constitution,
there should be such checks provided as would not frustrate the end and intention of delegating the power, but would, as far as it could be safely done, prevent the abuse of it; and
such checks are provided in the Constitution. Some of them were mentioned the last evening by one of my worthy colleagues; but I shall here exhibit all of them in one view.
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toral process; 25 8 2) the oath-taking requirement mandating that the President
and the Vice-President swear to uphold the Constitution;259 3) the similar oathtaking requirement imposed upon Senators and Congressmen; 26° 4) the impeachment process; 261 5) the prohibition against Senators and Congressmen
holding any other position in the federal government; 262 6) the prohibition of the
federal government granting any title of nobility and of any federal government
official receiving such a title from a foreign state;263 and 7) the requirement that
the federal government guarantee every state "a republican form of
'264
government."
Bowdoin also enumerated several other essential checks expressly established in the Constitution, including the President's right to veto federal legislation, 2 65 the requirement that all federal legislative proceedings and all federal
expenditures be published as matter of public record, 266 and the requirement
that public funds be spent only after legislative appropriation. 267 Finally, he
identified
a further guard against the abuse of power, which, though not expressed, is strongly implied in the federal Constitution, and, indeed, in
the constitution of every government founded on the principles of
equal liberty; and that is, that those who make the laws....
do, in
common with their fellow-citizens, fall within the power and operation
268
of those laws.
Never in giving this purportedly complete list of constitutional checks, however,

did Bowdoin mention judicial review of legislation.
Theophilius Parsons, another supporter of the Constitution, similarly failed
to identify judicial review as an effective check upon the federal government.
Speaking after Bowdoin, Parsons explained that he wished, in part, to expand
upon Bowdoin's list of checks. 269 First, Parsons noted that "[tihe oath the several legislative, executive, and judicial officers of the several states take to support the federal Constitution, is as effectual a security against the usurpation of
the general government as it is against the encroachment of the state governId. at 85.
257. Id. at 86.

258. Id. at 85; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cis. 1-4; id art. I, § 3, cls. 2-4; id. art. II, § 1, cls. 2-3.
259. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 85-86; see U.S. CONsT art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
260. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 86; see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
261. 2 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 214, at 86; see U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3,
cls. 6-7; id art. II, § 4.
262. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 86; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
263. 2 ELLIoT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 86; see U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
264. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 86; see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
265. 2 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 214, at 86; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cis. 2-3.
266. 2 ELLIoT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 86; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 9,
cl.7.
267. 2 ELLIoT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 86; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. He also
identified "the negative which each house has upon the acts of the other" as an important check. 2
ELLIOT'S DEBATES,

supra note 214, at 86:

268. 2 ELLIoT's DEBATES, supra note 214, at 87.

269. Id. at 93.
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ments.' ' 270 Second, he asserted:
[T]here is another check, founded in the nature of the Union, superior
to all the parchment checks that can be invented. If there should be a
usurpation, it will not be on the farmer and merchant, employed and
attentive only to their several occupations; it will be upon thirteen legislatures,completely organized,possessed of the confidence of the people,
and having the means as well as inclination, successfully to oppose it.
Under these circumstances, none but madmen would attempt a usurpation. But... the people themselves have it in their power effectually
to resist usurpation, without being driven to an appeal to arms. An act
of usurpation is not obligatory; it is not law; and any man may be
justified in his resistance. Let him be considered as a criminal by the
generalgovernment,yet only hisfellow-citizens can convict him; they are
hisjury, and if they pronounce him innocent, not all the powers of Congress can hurt him; and innocent they certainly will pronounce
him, if
27 1
the supposed law he resisted was an act of usurpation.
Parsons could have relied on federal judges to accomplish this check. He
could have declared that judges would invalidate any federal legislation contravening constitutionally safeguarded individual rights as affecting an impermissible "usurpation" of power. However, like his Antifederalist adversaries,
Parsons did not put his faith in professional judges. Instead, he trusted the state
legislatures to intervene when Congress enacted laws violating the Constitution.
Failing the legislatures' intervention, he trusted juries to override such laws in
272
practice by refusing to convict people for violating the offending laws.
Like Parsons, the Federalist, Reverend Thomas Thatcher, failed to identify
judicial review as a check on the federal government. Instead, Thatcher highlighted the state legislatures' ability to act as a check. 273 He asserted:
There are other restraints, which, though not directly named in this
Constitution, yet are evidently discerned by every man of common observation. These are, the government of the several states, and the
270. Id. at 93-94.
271. Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
272. Cf E. CoRwiN, supra note 66, at 43 (describing Parsons as advocating "state interposition

and trial by jury, but nothing approximating judicial review more closely than the power of juries to

take the law into their own hands when returning general verdicts"); see also 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 214, at 162 (Parsons asserting that there was no need for a federal bill of rights because
"no power was given to Congress to infringe on any one of the natural rights of the people by this
Constitution; and, should they attempt it without constitutional authority, the act would be a nullity,
and could not be enforced").
273. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supranote 214, at 145. Thatcher did note that the federal judiciary's
independence from the executive and Congress could serve as a check on those branches, but he did
not contemplate judicial review as a facet of that check. Instead, Thatcher viewed independent
judges as a check because they would be insulated from pressures exerted by the other branches of
the federal government that otherwise could induce them to ignore previously passed laws or the
Constitution. He asserted: "The independence of judges is one of the most favorable circumstances
to public liberty; for when they become... the hirelings of tyranny, all property is precarious, and
personal security at an end; a man may be stripped of all his possessions; and murdered, without the
forms of laws." Id. Other supporters of the Constitution als6 ignored judicial review in identifying
checks on the federal government's abuse of its powers. At the very end of the Massachusetts ratifying convention, Reverend Samuel Stillman enumerated a long list of such checks without mentioning
judicial review. Id. at 165-69.
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spirit of liberty in the people. Are we wronged or injured, our
immedi274
ate representatives are those to whom we ought to apply.
If the legislative representatives failed to intercede on the people's behalf, then
Thatcher relied upon the people's right to revolt as the ultimate sanction for
governmental misconduct. "[S]hould any servants of the people, however eminent their stations, attempt to enslave" the people, Thatcher maintained, "from

this spirit of liberty such opposition would arise as would bring them to the
scaffold.

' 275

Judicial review figured nowhere in Thatcher's scheme of limited,

constitutional government.
Surprisingly, Samuel Adams, whom many Federalists regarded as hostile to
the new Constitution, 276 was the only delegate to assert specifically that the

Constitution might endow judges with the power to review legislation. He contended that an amendment similar to the present-day tenth amendment would
improve the Constitution by enabling courts to invalidate legislation that exceeded Congress's specifically enumerated powers. 277 Adams observed that

adopting such an amendment would address the often-stated concern that Congress would usurp powers not delegated to it, and would "give[] assurance that,

if any law made by thefederal government should be extended beyond the power

granted by the proposed Constitution, and inconsistent with the constitution of this
'27 8
state, it will be an error, and adjudged by the courts of law to be void."
Several aspects of Adams's characterization of judicial review should be

noted. First, he depicted judicial review as a mechanism by which the states'
reserved powers and constitutions could be safeguarded against federal encroachment. His advocacy of states' rights makes it uncertain whether he would

have endorsed federal judicial power to invalidate state legislation. 279 Second,

like Wilson during the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, Adams characterized
judicial review as involving enforcement of express constitutional terms. Adams

never suggested that judges could look beyond such express constitutional terms
to invalidate legislation contravening unenacted natural law. Third, Adams

seemed to believe that an express constitutional provision resembling the present-day tenth amendment must be adopted to enable judges to review legislation. 280 If Adams had been espousing Cokean theory under which judges
274. Id. at 145.
275. Id. at 145-46.
276. See 4 ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 214, at 3 (Storing's introductory description of the
writings of New England Antifederalists). Despite the Federalists' concerns, Adams eventually
voted for ratification. See 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 178.
277. The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. Adams advocated adopting an amendment providing "that all
powers not expressly delegated to Congress are reserved to the several states, to be by them exercised." 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 131.
278. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 131 (emphasis added).
279. Cf.H. DAVIS, THE JUDICIAL VETO 88 (1914) (asserting that when Adams made this statement, "the strong inference is that he referred to state courts only [because]... [he] was discussing
... limitations to be imposed on the national government in favor of the States; and [because] he
mention[ed] this action of'the courts of law' as a primary instance of exercise of a reserved power by
the States"), quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 251, at 125 (emphasis added).
280. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
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purportedly may void legislation to enforce natural-law principles regardless of
whether they have been codified, then no such amendment would have been
necessary.
In short, no declared supporter of the Constitution attending the Massachusetts convention clearly suggested that the Constitution authorized federal
courts to engage in interpretivist review of both state and federal legislation.
Moreover, no one even alluded to the practice of noninterpretivist judicial review. Adams, whose support for the Constitution was equivocal, was the only
delegate to mention judicial review, and then only in the context of a proposed
amendment to empower the courts to invalidate federal statutes encroaching
upon the states' expressly reserved powers.
On the other end of the spectrum, the Massachusetts Antifederalists echoed
the objections of the Pennsylvania Antifederalists. They too feared the expansive powers that the Constitution granted the federal government, including the
judiciary. 281 The Antifederalist Abraham Holmes, for example, asserted that
"Congress possessed... powers enabling [it] to institute judicatories little less
inauspicious than a certain tribunal in Spain, which has long been the disgrace of
Christendom: I mean that diabolical institution, the Inquisition. '28 2 Like their
Pennsylvanian brethren, the Massachusetts Antifederalists trusted juries, not
judges, to safeguard the people's rights and opposed the Constitution in part
because they viewed it as eliminating jury trials in civil suits. Finally, as was the
case in Pennsylvania, the delegates most distrusting of the constitutional powers
conferred upon all three branches of the federal government most adamantly
demanded adoption of a federal bill of rights. 283 As was the case in Pennsylvania, these Massachusetts Antifederalists clearly were not calling for adoption of a federal bill of rights to enable federal courts to void legislation to
protect the rights identified therein, and especially not to enable the courts to
void legislation to protect natural-law rights not enumerated in such an
instrument.
C. Virginia Ratifying Debates
The Virginia debates differ from the earlier debates entertained in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania in their overall analytical quality and in the thor2 84
oughness with which the delegates discussed article III of the Constitution.
281. See, eg., 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 109-12 (remarks of Abraham Holmes);
see also supranote 253 and accompanying text (discussing concerns of Pennsylvania Antifederalists).
Many Massachusetts Antifederalists, however, were less articulate in explaining their objections,
often expressing only a generalized fear of the new Constitution and suspicion of the socially prominent men who framed it. See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 102 (Amos Singletary
asserting that "[t]hese lawyers and men of learning, and moneyed men, that talk so finely.... expect
to be the managers of this Constitution.... and then they will swallow up all us little folks, like the

great Leviathan").
282. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 111.
283. See, eg., id. at 132 (Samuel Adams summarizing the Antifederalists' recommended modifications of the Constitution).
284. The delegates devoted four days of discussion to article III and spent more than three weeks
debating the merits of the Constitution.
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Despite the extensive discussion of article III, few supporters of the Constitution
explicitly indicated that this article authorized judicial review. James Madison,
for example, implied, but did not specifically state, that federal judges might
review legislation to enforce the Constitution. In defending the grant of federal
jurisdiction provided by the "arising under clause," he referred only cryptically
to the power of judicial review:

It may be a misfortune that, in organizing any government, the explication of its authority should be left to any of its coordinate branches.
There is no example in any country where it is otherwise. There is a
new policy in submitting it to the judiciary of the United States. That
causes of a federal nature will arise, will be obvious to every gentleman
who will recollect that the states are laid under restrictions, and that
the rights of the Union are secured by these restrictions. 28 5
While judicial review by federal courts to enforce the constitutional restrictions
imposed on Congress and the states obviously could be a component of this new
"policy," Madison certainly did not make this point explicitly.
The Federalist Edmund Pendleton, who served as the Virginia convention's
president and who previously had expressed doubts about the Virginia judiciary's power to void legislation in the Caton case, 28 6 also implied that the Constitution authorized judicial review. In vigorously defending article III, he asked:
"Must not the judicial powers extend to enforce the federal laws, govern its own
officers, and confine them to the line of their duty? Must it not protect them, in
the proper exercise of duty, against all opposition, whether from individuals or
state laws?" 28 7 Earlier in the debates, Pendleton also noted that state court
judges "have prevented the operation of some unconstitutional acts," 288 thereby
implying that federal judges similarly might invalidate legislation. Assuming
that Pendleton was in fact suggesting the federal courts would review legislation,
he nevertheless minimized the importance of judicial review in the federal system. Immediately after making the statement that federal courts must protect
federal laws from "opposition," Pendieton stated: "Notwithstanding [the federal judiciary], I rely upon the principles of the government-that it will produce its own reform, by the responsibility resulting from frequent elections. We
are finally safe while we preserve the representative character. '28 9 Pendleton's
remarks, then, while not foreclosing the possibility that federal courts might
review legislation, did not indicate definitively that federal courts would exercise
such a power either.
Edmund Randolph was perhaps the delegate most troubled by judicial review. Randolph initially refused to sign the Constitution at the close of the Fed285. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 532.
286. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
287. 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 214, at 548. Pendleton also pointed to the paper money
and tender laws passed by a number of states to defeat creditors' claims as exempliying why federal
judges must possess the foregoing powers: "Paper money and tender laws may be passed in other
states, inopposition to the federal principle, and restriction of this Constitution, and will need jurisdiction in the federal judiciary, to stop its pernicious effects." Id. at 549.
288. Id. at 299.
289. Id.
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eral Convention, in part because he believed it needed amendments, including an
amendment to "limit[] and defin[e] the judicial power. '2 90 However, he ultimately supported ratification of the Constitution with amendments. 29 1
Seeming to approve ofjudicial review, Randolph, on the one hand, asserted
that
nothing is granted which does not belong to [the] federal judiciary.
Self-defense is its first object. Has not the Constitution said that the
state shall not use such and such powers, and given exclusive powers to
Congress? If the state judiciaries could make decisions conformable to
the laws of their states, in derogation [ofl the federal government...
the federal government would soon be encroached upon. If a particular state must be at liberty, through its judiciary, to prevent or impede
the operation of the general government, the latter should soon be undermined. It is, then, necessary that its jurisdiction should "extend to
all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution and the laws
'292
of the United States."
On the other hand, however, Randolph criticized article III for providing "too
293
great an extension of jurisdiction":
It is ambiguous in some parts, and unnecessarily extensive in others. It
extends to all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution.
What are these cases of law and equity? Do they not involve all rights,
from an inchoate right to a complete right, arising from the Constitution?... What do we mean by the words arisingunder this Constitution? What do they relate to? I conceive this to be very ambiguous. If
my interpretation be right, the word arisingwill be carried so far that it
294
will be made use of to aid and extend the federal jurisdiction.
Randolph thus evidently considered judicial review a means by which federal judges could exercise the legitimate judicial function of self-defense. However, his clearly stated concern about interpreting article III to enable the federal
judiciary to extend its jurisdiction strongly suggests that Randolph would not
have endorsed noninterpretivist judicial review.
It is also noteworthy that Randolph failed to discuss judicial review of federal legislation as a means of enforcing the Constitution in two instances in
which such discussion would have been particularly germane. First, he failed to
mention judicial review in addressing objections to the necessary and proper
clause. 2 95 Randolph conceded that the clause was ambiguous, but asserted that
290. Letter from Edmund Randolph to the Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates
1787), reprintedin I ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 491.

(Oct. 10,

291. Randolph changed his mind and supported ratification of the Constitution because he determined that the consequences of nonadoption could be disastrous. Cf. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 214, at 471 (Randolph asserting during the Virginia ratifying convention that "though I do not
reverence the Constitution... its adoption is necessary to avoid the storm which is hanging over
America... no greater curse can befall her than the dissolution of the political connection between

the states").
292.
293.
294.
295.

Id. at 570.
Id. at 571.
Id. at 572.
See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
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any harm this ambiguity could cause would be averted -through constitutional
interpretation. He did not, however, look to the courts to perlbrm this ameliorating interpretive role. Rather, he looked first to Congress and then to the
constitutional amendment process: "[T]he members of Congress themselves will
explain the ambiguous parts; and if not, the states can combine in order to insist
on amending the ambiguities. I would depend on the present actual feeling of
the people of America, to introduce any amendment which may be
296
necessary."
Second, Randolph failed to mention judicial review in explaining why the
ratifiers should adopt a constitutional amendment equivalent to the present-day
tenth amendment. While Randolph viewed such an amendment as an important
mechanism to prevent federal laws from exceeding Congress's enumerated powers, he suggested that the amendment would be enforced by the state legislatures
or, alternatively, by the people in refusing to obey the offending laws. Randolph

asserted that, if such an amendment were added to the Constitution, the states
and the people would "be at liberty to consider as a violation of the Constitution
every exercise of a power not expressly delegated therein." 297 Randolph's failure to discuss judicial review when such a discussion would have been so apposite raises questions about his support for judicial invalidation of federal
legislation-a practice that, given his concerns about limiting the federal government's powers, he logically should have endorsed.
Fittingly, it was John Marshall, the future Chief Justice of the United
States, who first explicitly stated at the Virginia convention that the Constitution
authorized judicial review. Marshall sought to refute the Antifederalist objection that the "arising under" clause would give the federal judiciary virtually
298
unlimited jurisdiction and, thereby, would annihilate the state governments.
Marshall queried: "Has the government of the United States power to make
laws on every subject?... Can they go beyond the delegated powers?" 299 Answering his own question, he asserted: "If they were to make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated, it would be considered by the judges as
an infringement [against] which they are to guard. They would not consider
such a law as coming under their jurisdiction. They would declare it void." 3° °
He added that the judiciary was the only "quarter" to which Americans could
look "for protection from an infringement [of] the Constitution." 30 1 Although
Marshall never specifically indicated that the Constitution also authorizes judges
to invalidate state legislation, this result logically flows from his characterization
of judicial review. If courts must be empowered to invalidate federal legislation
not enacted pursuant to Congress's enumerated powers, then they equally must
be authorized to invalidate state legislation encroaching upon those enumerated
powers.
296. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 471.

297. Id. at 576.
298. See, e.g., id. at 527 (objection of George Mason).

299. Id. at 553.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 554.
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Even the future author of Marburyv. Madison,30 2 however, never suggested
at the Virginia convention that the Constitution authorizes judicial enforcement
of unwritten natural-law principles. 30 3 Indeed, in attempting to refute the
charge that the Constitution abolished jury trials in civil suits, Marshall reached

a conclusion about the Virginia Bill of Rights inconsistent with both Cokean
theory and with the practice of noninterpretivist judicial review. Marshall ar-

gued that the Virginia Constitution did not itself guarantee jury trials in civil
suits because the right to jury trials was protected only by "our bill of rights,
which is not a part of the Constitution. ' '3° 4 He characterized Virginia's "bill of

rights... [as] merely recommendatory,

'30 5

and maintained that its precatory

and nonbinding status was beneficial. "Were it otherwise," he asserted, "the
consequence would be that many laws which are found convenient would be
unconstitutional. 3 0 6 Had Marshall been espousing Cokean natural-law theory,

the "recommendatory" status of the bill of rights-and, indeed, its very existence-would have been irrelevant. Cokean theory supposedly would authorize

judges to invalidate legislation abridging fundamental rights derived from natural law regardless of whether those rights have been codified in statutes or
307
constitutions.

Challenging the Federalists' defense of article III, the Antifederalist George
Mason, who refused to sign the Constitution after attending the Federal Con302. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
303. Marshall's statements at the Virginia convention were consistent with his subsequent Marbury opinion. As William Nelson points out, in Marbury, Marshall characterized the Constitution
as setting out "fundamental principles" of law that were intended to be "permanent," explaining that
the Constitution derived this status from the people's "original right to establish, for their future
government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness." Nelson, The Eighteenth Century Background ofJohn Marshall'sConstitutionalJurisprudence,76 MicH.
L. REv. 893, 937 (1978) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176). Thus, as Nelson observes,
Marshall did not attribute the status of the Constitution as fundamental law in Marbury to any
supposed identity between the principles contained in that instrument and those created by natural
law. Id. But see infra note 307 (evaluating significance of later Supreme Court decisions in which
Marshall did discuss natural law principles in adjudicating constitutional issues).
304. 3 ELLIoT's DEBATES, supra note 214, at 561.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. In opinions he authored after Marbury, however, Marshall did rely, at least partially, on
natural-law principles in rendering constitutional decisions. See, eg., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819); Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810). In his Fletcher opinion, for example, Marshall reasoned
that a Georgia statute, which effectively nullified the title of a bona fide purchaser for value and
divested him of his property, was unconstitutional based on either "general principles which are
common to our free institutions, or by the particular provisions of the constitution of the United
States." Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 139; see id. at 132. Marshall's statements during the Virginia convention and his recognition of the doctrine of popular ratification in Marbury, see supra
note 303, thus conflict with his later decisions in cases such as Fetcher. Nelson has suggested that
this conflict indicates that Marshall sought to strike a balance between his Cokean belief in certain
paramount, universally recognized principles, which positive laws must not abridge, and his competing democratic belief that "'the best rule for freemen.., was ... obedience to laws enacted by a
majority.'" Nelson, supranote 303, at 933 (quoting Marshall's Address of the Minority: Journal of
Virginia House of Delegates 88-90 (Dec. 1798)). "[To reconcile the people's transcendent power
with the law's immutable principles," id., Nelson opines that Marshall, in cases such as Fletcher,
distinguished between "law and politics" and thereby sought "to circumscribe, however imperfectly,
the extent to which the political, majoritarian style could engulf all government, as it was threatening in 1800 to do." Id. at 935.
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vention, 30 8 perceived that the rationale Marshall had advanced for judicial review of federal legislation also would justify judicial review of state legislation.
Mason vehemently opposed authorizing federal courts to review legislation. He
believed that these courts invariably would use this power not to check the federal government, but to serve its own ends at the expense of the states' and the
people's liberties. 30 9 For Mason, federal judges appointed by the general gov3 10
ernment were "not men in whom the community can place confidence."
Consequently, he objected to virtually every power that article III granted to the
federal judiciary, 3 11 asserting "that the greater part of these powers are unnecessary, and dangerous, as tending to impair, and ultimately destroy, the state judiciaries, and, by the same principle, the legislation of the state[s]." '3 12 He again
objected to authorizing federal judicial review when he explained why he opposed the ex post facto clause, noting that "[a]s an express power is given to the
federal court ... to declare null all ex post facto laws, I think [that] gentlemen
' 313
must see there is danger, and that it be guarded against.
Other opponents of the Constitution echoed Mason. William Grayson asserted that the federal courts would interfere unduly "with the state judiciaries,"
contending that state judges "are the best check we have... [to] secure us from
encroachments on our privileges."'3 14 John Tyler similarly charged that the
'3 15
Constitution imposed no "limitation ... or restriction on [federal judges];
that the constitutional provision mandating "the supremacy of the laws of the
Union, and of treaties, are exceedingly dangerous; ' 3 16 and that "ambiguities" in
the Constitution would put liberty in danger. 317 Like Mason, these Antifederal308. See Objections of the Hon. George Mason, One of the Delegates From Virginia in the Late
ContinentalConvention, to the ProposedFederalConstitution;Assigned as His Reasonsfor Not Signing the Same, reprintedin I ELLIoT's DEBATES, supra note 214, at 494-96.
309.. See, eg., 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 524.
310. Id.
311. Mason believed that the lower federal courts' appellate jurisdiction should be limited to
suits brought by citizens of the same state claiming land grants from two different states. See id. at
523. He also asserted that the Supreme Court should not possess equity jurisdiction and that it
should have no power to review questions of fact. See id. at 524.

312. Id. at 527. Richard Henry Lee raised similar objections in his Letters from the Federal
Farmer to the Republican. See 2 ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 214, at 24345.
313. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supranote 214, at 480. For the ex post facto clause, see U.S. CONsr.
art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
314. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 563. Grayson also asserted that the grant of "jurisdiction of all cases arising under the Constitution and the laws of the Union is of stupendous
magnitude," id. at 565, and that the Constitution endowed the Supreme Court with "more power
than any court under heaven." Id. at 564. On the day following Marshall's defense of judicial
review, see supranotes 299-301 and accompanying text, however, Grayson indicated that he may not
have opposed the courts' exercise of this power as a means of checking the federal government.
Grayson asserted: "If the Congress cannot make a law against the Constitution, I apprehend they
cannot make a law to abridge it. The judges are to defend it. They can neither abridge nor extend
it." See 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 214, at 567.
315. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 638-39.
316. Id. at 641.
317. Id. at 642. Although Virginia Antifederalists generally placed more faith in their state's
judges than did Antifederalists from other states, see, eg., supra note 245 and accompanying text,
they also placed great faith in juries and condemned the new Constitution because they believed it
abolished jury trials in civil suits. See eg., 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 214, at 539 (remarks of
Patrick Henry); infra note 335 (other Virginia Antifederalists emphasizing the virtue of juries).
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ists believed that the federal judiciary would be an instrument of national consolidation serving the federal government to the state governments' and the
people's detriment.
The Virginia Antifederalists' position once again contradicts Sherry's inferences that the Antifederalists' accepted judicial review. Like their compatriots
in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, the Virginia Antifederalists who most adamantly objected to the federal judiciary's powers under the new Constitution
also demanded adoption of a federal bill of rights.3 18
George Mason, for example, made it crystal clear that he was not demanding adoption of a federal bill of rights to enable federal judges to invalidate state
legislation or to enforce the unwritten natural law from which these federal
rights were derived. Proposing a hypothetical, he used the general welfare
clause to make this point:
Now, suppose oppressions should arise under this government, and
any writer should dare to stand forth, and expose to the community at
large the abuses of those powers; could not Congress, under the idea of
providing for the general welfare, and under their own construction,
say that this was destroying the general peace, encouraging sedition,
and poisoning the minds of the people? And could they not, in order
3 19
to provide against this, lay a dangerous restriction on the press?
He concluded:
That Congress should have power to provide for the general welfare of
the Union, I grant. But I wish a clause in the Constitution, with respect to all powers which are not granted, that they are retained by the
states. Otherwise, the power of providing for the general welfare may
320
be perverted to its destruction.
Mason thus demanded a federal bill of rights to ensure that the federal government, including the federal courts, would not expand that government's powers
by utilizing vague constitutional terms-much less even vaguer natural law.3 2 1
Grayson and Tyler also indicated that they were demanding a bill of rights
to preclude the federal government from opportunistically expanding its powers
by exploiting vague constitutional provisions. Tyler asserted that the Virginia

convention must "do away [with] ambiguities" in the Constitution and "establish our rights [in] clear and explicit terms."' 322 Grayson similarly asserted that
"he did not believe there existed a social compact upon the face of the earth so
318. Cf 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 612 (Antifederalist John Dawson asserting that
the "clear and comprehensive language used when [constitutional] power is granted to Congress"
contrasted with the "ambiguous terms in which all rights are [granted] to the people" afforded
grounds for "suspicions and objections").
319. Id. at 441-42.
320. Id. at 442.
321. Sherry is correct, however, in assuming that the Virginia Antifederalists agreed with the
Federalists that man's most important rights were derived from natural law. See, eg., id. at 445
(Mason); id. at 448-49, 462 (Henry); id. at 449 (Grayson); id. at 641 (Tyler). Their fundamental
dispute with the Federalists concerned whether the states or the federal government would be most
likely, and therefore best entrusted, to protect these rights.
322. Id. at 642.
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vague and so indefinite as the one now on the table" 323 and that "he doubted
324
whether... anything given up to the federal government was retained."
It is, therefore, a clear misreading of the historical record to infer that these
delegates envisioned that their proposals for afederal bill of rights would enable
the federal judiciary to invalidate state legislation. A conclusion that the Virginia ratifying convention intended federal judges to protect unenumerated, natural law rights is similarly bereft of support in the record. 325
At first blush, however, the views of one ardent Virginia Axtifederalist appear to support Sherry's position. During the convention, Patrick Henry endorsed judicial review: "[O]ur judiciary . ..had firmness to counteract the

legislature in some cases.... They had fortitude to declare that they were the
judiciary, and would oppose unconstitutional acts." 326 Moreover, he added: "I
take it as the highest encomium on this country, that the acts of the legislature,
if unconstitutional, are liable to be opposed by the judiciary. '327 Henry also
linked judicial review with the existence of a bill of rights, suggesting that the
state had empowered Virginia judges to invalidate legislation by adopting a bill
of rights. 328 Conversely, Henry asserted that one of the greatest defects in the
Constitution was the absence of a bill of rights.329 He insisted: "If you intend to
reserve your unalienable rights, you must have the most express stipulation; for,
if implication be allowed, you are ousted of those rights.... You,. . .by a
natural and unavoidable implication, give up your rights to the general government."' 330 These remarks seem to support the inference that, in advocating
adoption of a federal bill of rights, Henry was accepting the premise that both
federal and state judges could invalidate legislation violating those rights.
Further examination of Henry's position, however, greatly weakens this inference. Henry did not trust the federal judiciary to safeguard individual rights
by invalidating statutes Congress enacted, even if the federal bill of rights he
championed ultimately were adopted. Henry made this point most emphatically
in response to one of Madison's suggestions. In an attempt to assuage Antifederalist fears that the federal courts' expansive jurisdiction would effectively abolish the state courts, 331 Madison had suggested that state court judges also might
sit as federal judges. 332 Henry responded with alarm to the suggestion "that our
state judges might be contented to be federal judges and state judges also," asserting that "[i]f we are to be deprived of that class of men, and if they are to
323. Id. at 583.
324. Id. at 449.
325. For further discussion of this point, see generally Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1980); Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REv.
223 (1983).
326. 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 214, at 324-25.

327. Id. at 325.
328. See id. at 462.
329. See, e.g., id. at 445-46, 448-89, 593.
330. Id. at 445-46.
331. See, eg., id. at 527 (George Mason asserting that article III will "annihilate your state
judiciary").
332. See id. at 536.
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' 333

Henry as-

sumed that federal judges necessarily would render decisions supporting Congress because they "are sworn to preserve the Constitution," and because they
"will be inclined to favor their own officers."1334 For this reason, he insisted that
only Virginia judges, "one of the best barriers against strides of power,

' 335

could

safeguard individual rights against federal encroachment, and that the states'
judges could achieve this end only if they possessed complete independence from
the federal government. He exhorted:
So small are the barriers against the encroachments and usurpations of
Congress, that, when I see this last barrier-the independency of [Virginia] judges-impaired, I am persuaded I see the prostration of all our
rights. In what situation will your judges be, when they are sworn to
preserve the Constitution of the state and of the general governmentl
...[B]y this system we lose our judiciary,336
and they cannot help us, we
must sit down quietly, and be oppressed.
Henry's position, then, provides only partial support for Sherry's inference
about the Antifederalists' position toward judicial review; his advocacy for a
federal bill of rights embodied acceptance only of statejudges' right to invalidate
federal legislation. Moreover, Henry's professed concern about precluding the
federal government from encroaching upon the rights of the states refutes
Sherry's corollary inference that the Antifederalists accepted federal noninterpretivist judicial review of state legislation on the basis of uncodified natural law.
At the close of the Virginia convention, the Antifederalists reaffirmed their
reasons for insisting upon adoption of a federal bill of rights when they persuaded the convention to send Congress a list of proposed amendments along
with Virginia's notice of ratification of the Constitution. 337 Two key amend333. Id. at 539.
334. Id. at 538; cf.id. at 539 (Henry asserted: 'They cannot serve two masters struggling for the
same object. The laws of the Constitution being paramount to those of the states, and to their
constitutions also, whenever they come in competition, the judges must decide in favor of the
former.").
335. Id. Other Virginia Antifederalists were less sanguine about the trustworthiness of judges.
Richard Henry Lee, writing under the pseudonym "The Federal Farmer," believed that jury trials
should be safeguarded in all cases because juries acted as a much-needed check on judges, who were
inherently "formidable, somewhat arbitrary and despotic." The Federal Farmer, An Additional
Number of Letters From the FederalFarmerto the Republican Leading to a FairExamination ofthe
System of Government Proposedby the Late Convention; to Several Necessary Alterations in it; and
Calculated to Illustrate the Principles and PositionsLaid Down in the PrecedingLetters (Jan. 18,
1788), reprinted in 2 ANTiFEDERALiST, supra note 214, at 256. In defending the sanctity of jurors
and of the general verdict, Lee wrote:
If the conduct of judges shall be severe and arbitrary, and tend to subvert the laws, and
change forms of the government, the jury may check them, by deciding against their opinions and determinations, in similar cases. It is true, that the freemen of a country are not
always minutely skilled in the laws, but they have common sense in its purity, which seldom or never errs in making and applying laws to the condition of the people, or in determining judicial causes, when stated to them by the parties.
Id. at 320; cf.3 ELLIoT'S DEBATES, supranote 214, at 528, 542, 568 (Antifederalist delegates to the
Virginia convention objecting to the Constitution because it did not safeguard jury trials in civil
suits).
336. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 539.
337. See id. at 659-61.
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ments that would become, with modifications, the ninth and tenth amendments
to the Constitution, 338 provided:

1st. That each state in the Union shall respectively retain every power,
jurisdiction,and right, which is not by this Constitutiondelegated to the
Congress of339
the United States, or to the departments of the federal
government.
17th. That those clauses which declare that Congress shall not exercise
certain powers, be not interpretedin any manner whatsoever, to extend

the powers of Congress; but that they be construed either as making
exceptions to the specified powers where this shall
be the case, or
34
otherwise, as inserted merely for greater caution.
These amendments clearly were designed to retain for the states all powers
not granted to the federal government, and conversely to limit the federal government to exercising only its enumerated constitutional powers. The Virginia
Antifederalists' support for these amendments further undermines the inference
that they accepted the proposition that federal judges could expand the federal
government's powers by invalidating state legislation based on natural-law principles not enumerated in the Constitution.

D. New York Ratifying Convention
Unlike the Virginia convention, the New York convention conducted no
focused discussion of article III. The New York delegates instead devoted the
overwhelming majority of their convention to debating Congress's powers under
article I. Even Alexander Hamilton, who so eloquently defended the practice of
judicial review in other fora, 34 1 failed to discuss judicial review in responding to
Antifederalist objections that the Constitution provided no effective checks on
Congress's powers. 342 Hamilton did note that "the laws of Congress are restricted to a certain sphere, and when they depart from this sphere, they are no

longer.., binding. '343 However, he never indicated clearly that judges would
338. See generally Caplan, supra note 325 (discussing the evolution of the ninth and tenth
amendments).
339. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 659 (emphasis added). This proposed amendment
clearly reflected Henry's concern that the people and the states could retain their rights only by
expressly reserving them in the Constitution. See supra text accompanying note 328.
340. 3 ELLO''s DEBATES, supra note 214, at 659, 661 (emphasis added). Commentators have
suggested that this amendment was designed to prevent courts from applying the rule of construction that Congress possessed all powers not expressly denied by the Constitution. See, eg., Caplan,
supra note 325, at 250-51.
341. See THa FEDERALIST Nos. 78-83, supra note 219, at 392-434 (A. Hamilton).
342. See, eg., 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 259, 334 (objections of Melancton
Smith), 338 (objections of John Williams), 359 (objections of Governor Clinton). Governor Clinton,
whose Antifederalist party was dubbed the "Clintonians," was surprisingly circumspect about his.
opposition to the Constitution during the New York convention's debates. At the end of the convention, however, he did send a letter to the other state governors urging them to procure their citizens'
acceptance of the extensive amendments to the Constitution that the New York Antifederalists had
proposed at the close of the convention. See Circular Letter from the Convention of the State of
New York to the Governors of the Several States in the Union (July 28, 1788), reprinted in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 413-14.
343. 2 ELLIoT's DEBATES, supra note 214, at 362.
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determine when Congress had exercised powers falling outside this sphere. In
identifying important constitutional checks, Hamilton discussed the President's
345

role;344 the division of legislative powers between the Senate and the House;
the separation of powers between the Congress, the executive and the judiciary;34 6 the state legislature's role; 347 and, ultimately, the people's role in revolting against the federal government. 34 8 Hamilton never mentioned judicial
review.
While no Antifederalist specifically objected to the Constitution because it
empowered federal judges to review legislation, a number of Antifederalists suggested that they would have opposed granting federal judges this power. For
example, Thomas Tredwell asked: "Have we not neglected to secure to ourselves the weighty matters of judgment and justice, by empowering the general
government to establish one supreme, and as many inferior, courts as they
please, whose proceedings they have a right to fix and regulate as they shall
think fit. .... [?]"349 He also charged that the federal judiciary's powers generally "may be extended to any degree short of almighty,1 350 and that the
Supreme Court would be a "Star Chamber.1 35 1 John Lansing, a New York
delegate to the Federal Convention who refused to sign the Constitution 352 and
who continued to oppose the Constitution during New York's ratifying convention, similarly objected to the expansive powers granted to the federal government, and specifically to the "extensive jurisdiction [given] to the federal
courts.1 353 He maintained that, "as the state governments will always possess a
better representation of the feelings.., of the people at large, it is obvious that
those powers can be deposited with much greater safety with the state than the
general government."' 354 Tredwell's vehement objections to the scope of the federal judiciary's powers under the Constitution and Lansing's insistence that only
the state governments could be trusted to represent the people's interests suggest
that both delegates would have been opposed to federal judges reviewing any
legislation, though their remarks do not necessarily indicate opposition to state
courts reviewing federal legislation.
Other Antifederalists voiced objections to Congress's powers under article I
that ambiguously implicated the federal judiciary's powers under article III.
John Williams, for example, objected to the necessary and proper clause on the
ground that a "case cannot be conceived which is not included in this
344. See id. at 253.
345. See id. at 348.
346. See id.
347. See id. at 257-58, 266-67.
348. See id. at 266-67.
349. Id. at 400.
350. Id. at 401.
351. Id. at 400.
352. For Lansing's reasons for refusing to sign the Constitution, see Letter from Robert Yates &
John Lansing to the Governor of New York (1787), reprintedin 1 ELLIoT's DEBATES, supra note
214, at 480-82.
353. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 372.
354. Id. at 217.
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power." 355 He contended that, because "[t]he legislature [and, in this case, Congress] is the highest power in a government[,] [w]hatever they judge necessary
for the proper administration of the powers lodged in them, they may execute
without any check or impediment.

' 356

Melancton Smith, the leader of the Anti-

federalist delegates, similarly asserted that the Constitution provided "no possibility of checking a government of independent powers, which extended to all
objects and resources without limitation[,] ...

such checks as would not leave

the exercise of the government to the operation of causes which, in their nature,
are variable and uncertain. '3 57 Smith also used the necessary and proper clause
to illustrate his point that Congress's powers under the Constitution could not
be limited. "Nothing... is left to construction," he maintained, "the powers are
most express."

' 358

Smith's and Williams's remarks can be interpreted in two contrary ways.
By focusing on their concern about the vagueness of constitutional provisions
such as the necessary and proper clause, one could conclude that Smith and
Williams would not have opposed empowering the federal courts to invalidate
federal legislation. However, their repeated objections that the national government would destroy the state governments 359 suggest that they would have opposed authorizing the federal courts to invalidate state legislation. Under this
interpretation, Smith and Williams were objecting to the Constitution for providing Congress with unlimited power and, thereby, depriving federal judges of
any opportunity to determine that Congress had passed laws inconsistent with
the Constitution. 360 Alternatively, by focusing on their view that Congress necessarily would be the most powerful branch of the federal government, one
could conclude that Smith and Williams simply failed to conceive of judicial
review. Under this interpretation, these Antifederalists were articulating the
English doctrine of legislative supremacy, which categorically denied judges the
36 1
power to invalidate legislation.
Although the Antifederalists did not clearly articulate their position about
the federal judiciary's power to review state or federal legislation during the
New York convention, the extensive amendments they proposed at the close of
the convention suggest that these delegates believed federal courts should not
exercise either power. In an amendment seconded by Melancton Smith, the Antifederalists proposed to prohibit Congress from establishing lower federal

courts with original jurisdiction over any suits, "except such as may be necessary
for trial of causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and for trial of piracies
355. Id. at 331.
356. Id. at 338.
357. Id. at 259.

358. Id. at 334. In this instance, Smith specifically was concerned that Congress would have
unlimited taxing power by virtue of the necessary and proper clause. See id.
359. See, eg., id. at 330-31, 339 (Williams's objections), 332, 334 (Smith's objections).
360. Raoul Berger has interpreted their remarks in this fashion. See K BERGER, supra note 251,
at 130.
361. C.G. Haines has interpreted their remaks in this fashion. See C.G. HAINES, supra note 24,

at 141.
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and felonies and piracies committed on the high seas."' 362 The Antifederalists
also proposed other amendments that would have drastically limited the lower
federal courts' appellate jurisdiction. These amendments would have precluded
these courts from hearing appeals brought by citizens of the same state or by
citizens of different states, unless the suit involved two people claiming land

grants under the laws of different states. 363 These amendments also would have
limited judicial discretion by precluding appellate courts from reviewing ques3 64
tions of fact.
To limit the Supreme Court's power, the Antifederalists proposed an additional amendment. This amendment would have deprived the Court of authority to render final, binding decisions by granting any party the right to appeal
the Court's judgment to a committee selected by the President and the Senate,
which would "correct the errors in such judgment... and to do justice to the
'365
parties in the premises."
Finally, to cement these limitations on the federal judiciary's powers, the
Antifederalists proposed an amendment providing "that the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court of the United States, or of any other court to be instituted by the
Congress, ought not, in any case, to be increased, enlarged, or extended, by any
fiction, collusion, or mere suggestion. '366 It seems clear that the last amendment would have prohibited noninterpretivist judicial review as a "fiction" unconstitutionally extending the federal courts' jurisdiction.
Moreover, had the foregoing amendments been adopted, nothing like the
contemporary practice of interpretivist judicial review could have evolved in the
federal courts. Lower federal courts would have had jurisdiction over very few
cases implicating constitutional questions, and even the Supreme Court would
not have been the final arbiter of such questions because its decisions would have
been subject to appeal. These results, in turn, suggest that the Antifederalists
advocating these amendments wished to prevent federal courts from reviewing
any type of legislation.
Like the Antifederalists in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, the
New York Antifederalists opposed the new Constitution because it did not contain a bill of rights. 367 The consistent recurrence of this pattern of Antifederalist
opposition to federal judicial authority, along with support for a federal bill of
rights, contradicts Sherry's inference that the Antifederalists were prepared to
accept federal judicial review of state legislation based either on express constitutional terms or on unwritten natural law.
The extensive debates about article III, which were conducted in the New
York Journalduring the months immediately preceding the New York conven362. 2 ELLIoT's DEBATES, supra note 214, at 408. The amendment was offered by a Mr. Jones,

whose first name is not identified in the official record. See id.
363. See id. at 409 (resolutions 3 & 6).

364. See id. at 408-09 (resolution 1 providing that "appeals from any courts in this state, proceeding according to the course of the common law, are to be by writ of error, and not otherwise").
365. Id. at 409 (resolution 8).
366. Id. (resolution 9).
367. See, eg., id. at 339 (Williams), 398 (Tredwell), 411-12 (Lansing).
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tion, 36s bring the controversy surrounding judicial review into much sharper
relief. "Brutus"-generally believed to be Robert Yates,3 69 the New York Delegate who, along with Lansing, refused to sign the Constitution after attending
the Federal Convention-mounted an Antifederalist attack on federal judicial
370
review, while Hamilton, writing as "Publius," provided a Federalist rebuttal.
Perhaps more systematically than any other Antifederalist, Brutus attacked

the powers article III granted to the federal judiciary. Articulating the egalitarian theory of natural law, Brutus maintained that article III was defective because it authorized the federal judiciary-a judiciary that the Constitution
rendered totally independent of the people-to render binding decisions concerning
the meaning of the Constitution and "the laws made in pursuance of
'3 7 1
it."

In Brutus's view, republican political principles dictated that electorally

accountable legislatures, not independent federal judges, should possess the ultimate authority to establish the meaning of the Constitution:
A constitution is a compact of a people with their rulers; if the rulers
break the compact, the people have a right and ought to remove them
and do themselves justice; but in order to enable them to do this with
greater facility, those whom the people chuse [sic] at stated periods,
should have the power in the last resort to determine the sense of the
compact; if they determine contrary to the understanding of the people, an appeal will lie to the people at the period when the rulers are to
be elected, and they will have it in their power to remedy the evil; but
when this power is lodged in the hands of men independent of the
people, and of their representatives, and who are not, constitutionally,
accountable for their opinions, no way
is left to control them but with a
372
high hand and an outstretched arm.

Although Brutus asserted that the Constitution violated republican political
principles because it authorized federal judges to interpret the express terms of
the people's compact with their governors and concomitantly to invalidate legislation found inconsistent with those terms, 373 this criticism did not constitute
his greatest objection to article III. What he found even more objectionable was
that the Constitution would enable federal judges to rove beyond express constitutional terms "to explain the constitution according to the reasoning and the
368. 2 ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 214, at 358 (Storing's introduction to the writings of
"Brutus").
369. Paul Leicester Ford made this attribution, after initially concluding that Thomas Tredwell
employed the pseudonym "Brutus." Compare P.L. FORD, PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 117 (1968) (Tredwell) with id. at 424 (Yates). William Jeffrey, however, has
asserted that Melancton Smith used this pseudonym. Jeffrey, The Letters of Brutus-A Neglected

Element of the Ratification Campaign of 1787-88, 40 U. CIN. L. REv. 643, 645 (1971).
370. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78-83 (A. Hamilton), supra note 219, at 392-434.
371. Brutus, Letter No. XI (Jan. 31, 1788), reprintedin 2 ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 214, at
418 [hereinafter Brutus]. Brutus believed that the Constitution rendered the federal judiciary uncontrollable by entitling judges to hold office during good behavior and prohibiting any reduction in
their salary. Id. at 418.
372. Brutus, supra note 371, at 442 (Letter No. XV, Mar. 20, 1788).
373. Cf. id. at 440 (Letter No. XV, Mar. 20, 1788) (contending that empowering the federal
judiciary to bind the legislature to its interpretation of the Constitution made its power "superior to
that of the legislature").

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 69

spirit of it, without being confined to the words or letter."'374 Brutus, in other
words, attacked article III precisely on the ground that it would permit judges to
engage in noninterpretivist review of legislation. He contended that this practice
inevitably would result from the vague wording of many constitutional provisions, which would permit federal judges to "mould the government, into almost
any shape they please." 375 He asserted further that this vague wording would be
combined with the constitutional grant of equity jurisdiction to give federal
judges carte blanche to decide cases without adhering to "any fixed or established rules."'3 76 For Brutus, this interpretive practice was an anathema to political liberty. "Had the construction of the constitution been left with the
legislature," Brutus contended, the legislature "would have explained it at their
peril; if they exceed[ed] their powers, or sought to find, in the spirit of the constitution, more than was expressed in the letter, the people from whom they derived their power could remove them."' 377 But under the proposed federal
constitution, Brutus warned, judges "independent... of every power under
heaven" 378 would interpret the spirit of the Constitution at the people's peril.
Commentators have debated whether Brutus's attack on judicial review led
Hamilton, writing as "Publius," to respond in numbers 78 through 83 of The
FederalistPapers.379 Regardless of Hamilton's specific motivations, however,
these papers did provide a sustained rebuttal to Brutus's arguments. Hamilton
mounted a frontal attack on Brutus's charge that the Constitution violated republican political principles by endowing the independent federal judiciary with
the final authority to establish the meaning of express constitutional terms. Perhaps believing "a strong offense to be the best defense," 380 Hamilton contended
in The Federalistnumber 78 that the federal judiciary must be endowed with
this final authority to safeguard the constitutional scheme of limited
government:
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited constitution. By a limited constitution I understand
one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such for instance as it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex
post facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved
in practice no other way than the medium of the courts of justice;
whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor
of the constitution void. Without this, all reservations of particular
374. Id. at 419 (Letter No. XI, Jan. 31, 1788).
375. Id. at 422 (Letter No. XI, Jan. 31, 1788). Brutus pointed in particular to the vague language in the preamble establishing that the objects of the Constitution were "to form a more perfect
union," "to establish justice," and "to provide for the general welfare." Id. at 425 (Letter No. XII,

Feb. 7,
376.
377.
378.

1788).
Id. at 420 (Letter No. XI, Jan. 31, 1788).
Id. at 442 (Letter No. XV, Mar. 20, 1788).
Id. at 438.
379. Compare E. CORWiN, supra note 66, at 45 and L. LEvY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
SUPREME COURT 6 (1967) (arguing that Hamilton was responding to "Brutus") with G. WILLS,
EXPLAINING AMERICA 130-50 (1981) (offering a different interpretation of Hamilton's motivations).
380. E. CORWIN, supra note 66, at 47.
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rights and privileges would amount to nothing. 38 1
Hamilton thus dealt with Brutus's charge that the Constitution was defective
because it authorized federal courts to construe its express terms by extolling
this purported defect as a constitutional virtue.
Hamilton, however, used a different tactic in responding to Brutus's charge
that the federal judiciary would be authorized to construe the Constitution according to its spirit rather than its letter. In The Federalistnumber 81, for example, Hamilton maintained "that the constitution ought to be the standard of
construction for the laws, and that wherever there is evident opposition, the laws

ought to give place to the constitution.

'382

But he assured his readers that the

federal judiciary's power to void legislation extended only to cases in which a
statute in fact contravened an express constitutional term: "Where is not a
syllable in the plan under consideration, which directly empowers the national
courts to construe the laws according to the spirit of the constitution." 3 83 In
The Federalistnumber 84, Hamilton again sought to rebut Brutus's charge that
the federal courts would enlarge the federal government's powers immeasurably
by construing the Constitution according to its spirit:
[Tihe judicial authority of the federal judicatures is declared by the
constitution to comprehend certain cases particularly specified. The
expression of those cases marks the precise limits beyond which the federal courts cannot extend theirjurisdiction;because the objects of their
cognizance being enumerated, the specification would be nugatory if it
384
did not exclude all ideas of more extensive authority.
Rather than defend noninterpretivist review of legislation, then, Hamilton expressly assured Brutus and his Antifederalist colleagues that federal judges
could not permissibly use this interpretive technique.
One can reasonably surmise that the delegates attending the New York convention understood that the Constitution could authorize the federal judiciary to
engage in interpretivist review of legislation because many of the delegates attending the New York ratifying convention were familiar with the writings of
"Brutus" and "Publius. '385 One cannot reasonably surmise, however, that the
delegates schooled in these writings understood that the Constitution also could
authorize the federal judiciary to engage in noninterpretivist review because
"Publius" had repudiated precisely this proposition.
381. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton), supra note 219, at 394 (emphasis added).
382. Id. No. 81, at 409 (emphasis added).
383. Id. (emphasis omitted).
384. Id. No. 84, at 442-43 (emphasis added).
385. See L. DE PAW, THE ELEVENTH PILLAR 104 (1966); P.L. FORD, supra note 369, at 117; S.
HARDING, THE CONTEST OVER RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION IN THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETrS 17-18 n.3 (1896); 2 ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 214, at 359 (Stodng's introduction to
the writings of "Brutus"). Indeed, during the New York ratifying convention, Hamilton reiterated
so many of the arguments he had first rehearsed in The Federalist"that Governor Clinton garcastically inquired if the young knight errant was planning to bring out a second edition." J. MILLER,
ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE GROWTH OF THE NEW NATION 212 (1959). Melancton Smith
also revealed his familiarity with "Publius's" writings by noting that Hamilton, "who speaks out
very frequently, very long, and very vehemently, has, like Publius, very much to say not applicable
to the subject." Id.
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E. North Carolina Ratifying Convention
Ironically, the North Carolina Federalists-who indicated more clearly
than had the Federalists in any of the preceding conventions that the Constitution would permit federal courts to review both state and federal legislationfailed to secure ratification of the Constitution. 386 Early in the convention, in
response to Antifederalist objections to the scope of Congress's powers under the
Constitution, John Steele stated that federal judges could invalidate federal legislation as a check upon Congress: "The judicial power of that [ie., the federal]
government is so well constructed as to be a check .... If the Congress make
laws inconsistent with the Constitution, independent judges will not uphold
them, nor will the people obey them."' 38 7 Unlike their colleagues in many of the
other conventions, the North Carolina Federalists did not shrink from asserting
the corollary proposition that the Constitution would also enable judges to invalidate state legislation. William R. Davie, one of North Carolina's delegates to
the Federal Convention, unequivocally stated this proposition:
Every member who has read the Constitution with attention must observe that there are certain fundamental principles in it, both of a positive and a negative nature, which, being intended for the general

welfare of the community, ought not to be violated by future legislation of the particular states. Every member will agree that the positive
386. In a 184 to 84 vote, the convention decided not to ratify the Constitution until it was
amended. See 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATEs, supra note 214, at 248-51. For discussion of some of these
amendments, see infra notes 395-96 and accompanying text.
387. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 214, at 71. Hamilton asserted that the enumeration of
legislative powers similarly marked the parameters within which Congress could act:
The plan of the convention declares that the power of congress, or in other words the
national legislature, shall extend to certain enumerated cases. This specification of particulars evidently excludes all pretension of a general legislative authority; because an affirmative grant of special powers would be absurd as well as useless, if a general authority was
intended.
Id. at 442.
In contrast to Steele's statement, both Governor Samuel Johnson and future Supreme Court
Justice James Iredell articulated the naive conception of judicial review, indicating that any law
passed by Congress not constituting an exercise of constitutionally delegated powers would be void,
but failing to assign the federal judiciary any special role in voiding such laws. In defending the
supremacy clause, Johnson asserted that "[t]he Constitution must be the supreme law of the land,"
and that "laws made in pursuance thereof by Congress ought to be the supreme law of the land." Id.
at 187. Accordingly, he also asserted: "When Congress shall make a law in virtue of their constitutional authority, it will be an actual law .... Every law consistent with the Constitution will have
been made in pursuance of the powers granted by it." Id. at 188. Conversely, he asserted that any
law Congress passed derogating from its constitutionally granted powers would be void, but failed to
suggest that judges would make such determinations: "Every usurpation or law repugnant to it
cannot have been made in pursuance of its powers. The latter will be nugatory and void." Id.
Iredell similarly failed to assign judges any role in invalidating unconstitutional statutes passed by
Congress, asserting:
If the Congress should claim any power not given to them, it would be as bare a usurpation
as making a king in America. If this Constitution be adopted, it must be presumed the
instrument will be in the hands of every man in America, to see whether authority be
usurped; and any person by inspecting it may see if the power claimed be enumerated. If it
be not, he will know it to be a usurpation.
Id. at 172; ef.id. at 194 (Iredell seemingly relied on the people's right to revolt rather than judicial
review to prevent Congress from violating the'Constitution in asserting that "[i]f any future Congress should pass an act concerning the religion of this country, it would be an act which they are
not authorized to pass by the Constitution, and which people would not obey.").
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regulations ought to be carried into execution, and that the negative
restrictions ought not to be disregarded or violated .... This great
object can only be safely and completely obtained by the instrumental3 88
ity of the federal judiciary.
No North Carolina Federalist, however, suggested that the proposed system of
government would empower federal judges to void either state or federal legislation based on natural-law principles not expressly codified in the Constitution.
Davie and Steele, who made the clearest statements about judicial review during
the Convention, both indicated that courts should invalidate only legislation that
was plainly inconsistent with express constitutional terms.
Moreover, in a last-ditch effort to prevent defeat of the Constitution, the
Federalist James Iredell proposed a constitutional amendment designed to ensure that no branch of the federal government could exercise any power not
expressly enumerated in the Constitution. This amendment, which would have
fulfilled the purpose ultimately served by the tenth amendment, provided:
Each state in the Union shall respectively retain... every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Constitution delegated to the
Congress of the United States, or to the departments of the general
government; nor shall the said Congress, nor any department of the
said government exercise any act of authority over any individual in
any of the said states, but such as can be justified under some power
particularlygiven in this Constitution, but the said Constitutionshall be
considered at all times a solemn instrument,defining the extent of their
authority,9 and the limits of which they cannot rightfully in any instance
38
exceed.
Given that this amendment would have precluded federal courts from invalidating any state statute unless that statute contravened "some power particularly
given in the Constitution"-in other words, an express constitutional termIredell's amendment represented an additional assurance from North Carolina's
Federalists that the federal courts would not engage in noninterpretivist review
of legislation.
The North Carolina Antifederalists were not mollified by the suggestion
that federal courts might review legislation to enforce the Constitution. Like the
Virginia Antifederalists, they did not want the federal judiciary to exercise this
power. The North Carolina Antifederalists believed that federal judicial review
would be a vehicle for national consolidation, that "the laws of the United States
must necessarily clash with the laws of the individual states, in consequence of
which the states will be obstructed and the state governments absorbed."1390 Because the Constitution conferred powers upon the federal government in vague
and often fearsomely broad terms, these Antifederalists believed that federal
388. Id. at 156-57.
389. Id. at 249 (proposed amendment 1) (emphasis added).
390. Id. at 160 (Davie summarizing the Antifederalist position). To the extent these Antifederalists trusted judges, they trusted only state court judges. Compare id. at 136, 139, 142, 168-69
(Antifederalists speaking approvingly of North Carolina judges) with id. at 142-43, 202-03 (Antifederalists opposing the Constitution on the ground that it eliminated jury trials in civil suits brought
before the federal judiciary).
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judges, sworn to uphold the United States Constitution and laws, would expand
the federal government's powers without limit, if they were permitted to review
legislation. For example, William Lenoir contended that the federal government's constitutionally granted powers were "very indefinite. '39 1 He contended
that this indefiniteness was a threat to the people's liberties because all men serving the federal government "will naturally put the fullest construction on the
powers given them." 392 Timothy Bloodworth similarly opposed the indefiniteness of the supremacy clause, stating: "It appears to me to sweep off all the
constitutions of the states.... The judges are sworn to uphold it. It will pro' 393
duce an annihilation of the state governments.
In an overwhelming defeat of the Federalists, 394 the North Carolina convention refused to ratify the Constitution until far-reaching amendments were
adopted. The convention proposed amendments including extensive amendments to article III, which reaffirmed the Antifederalist delegates' opposition to
federal judicial review. The delegates' amended version of article III would have
precluded lower federal courts from reviewing legislation by limiting these
courts' jurisdiction to admiralty cases. 395 Furthermore, their amended version

of article III would have drastically curtailed the Supreme Court's jurisdiction,
permitting the Court to hear only cases "arising under treatiesL;]... cases affecting ambassadors, other foreign ministers, and consuls; cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction;... controversies in which the United States is a party;...
controversies between two or more states, and [between] parties claiming lands
under the grant of different states."'39 6 Thus, the proposed North Carolina
amendment to article III would have permitted the Court to invalidate statutes
only in cases in which a statute conflicted with a treaty.
The North Carolina Antifederalists also insisted on a federal bill of rights as
397
a condition precedent to North Carolina's ratification of the Constitution.
Once again, the North Carolina Antifederalists did not demand adoption of a
federal bill of rights to enable federal courts to review legislation; their proposed
amendments to article III were designed to prevent federal courts from exercis391. Id. at 206.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 179; cf. id. at 93 (William Goudy asserting that Congress's broad powers under the
new Constitution "will totally destroy our liberties"), 169 (Matthew Locke expressing distrust of the
federal judiciary), 176 (Andrew Bass observing that so many different interpretations of article III
had been advanced that "he thought the thing was either uncommonly difficult, or absolutely
unintelligible"), 187 (David Caldwell objecting to article III on the ground that it was "equivocal
and ambiguous").
394. See supra note 386.
395. As amended, article III would have provided that "the judicial power of the United States
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such courts ofadmiralty as Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish." 4 ELLIOr's DEBATES, supranote 214, at 246 (proposed amendment XV)
(emphasis added).
396. Id. (proposed amendment XV). Thus, article III, as amended, would not have contained
the "arising under" clause, which gives the Court jurisdiction over "all cases arising under the Constitution" and "the Laws of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.

397. 4 ELLIoT's DEBATES, supra note 214, at 242-44 (North Carolina convention's proposed

"Declaration of Rights").
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ing this power. 398 Moreover, regardless of their belief in natural law, these Antifederalists certainly were not demanding a federal bill of rights to enable the
federal judiciary to expand its jurisdiction by looking beyond express constitu399
tional terms to invalidate legislation on the basis of unwritten natural law.
Thus, in each state ratifying convention surveyed, the Antifederalists articulated positions directly contrary to Sherry's thesis that their call for a federal
bill of rights entailed an acceptance of noninterpretivist judicial review. In each
convention, the Antifederalists unequivocally demanded adoption of a federal
bill of rights to limit the powers of all three branches of the federal government,
not to authorize the federal government to void legislation infringing upon the
rights identified in such an instrument, and certainly not to authorize the voiding of legislation infringing upon unenumerated natural-law rights.4°° Moreover, the Antifederalists in Pennsylvania, Virginia, New York, and North
Carolina all proposed constitutional amendments plainly designed to ensure that
the federal government exercised only its constitutionally enumerated powers.4° 1 These Antifederalists, therefore, would have bitterly objected to any assertion that the federal judiciary had the power to void state legislation to
enforce unwritten natural-law principles. Indeed, in the clearest instance in
which an Antifederalist discussed noninterpretivist judicial review, "Brutus"
emphatically repudiated this practice.402
The remarks of the Federalists attending the state ratifying conventions
also fail to support Sherry's thesis. No proponent of the Constitution attending
any of these conventions suggested that the Constitution would authorize
noninterpretivist review of legislation,4 03 and Hamilton, writing as "Publius,"
specifically stated that the Constitution would not authorize this practice. 4° 4 Indeed, the remarks of the proponents for the Constitution, taken collectively, fail
to evince even a coherent theory of interpretivist judicial review. Some delegates, including Wilson during the Pennsylvania convention and Davie and
Steele during the North Carolina convention, did indicate that the Constitution
would enable the federal judiciary to invalidate both federal and state legislation.4° 5 But other delegates, like Adams during the Massachusetts convention,
398. See also id. at 136-37, 163 (Spencer demanding a federal bill of rights to impose effective

limitations on the federal government, including the judiciary), 167 (similar remarks from Bloodworth), 168-69 (similar remarks from Locke), 202, 206 (similar remarks from Lenoir).
399. For statements in which the North Carolina Antifederalists evinced their belief in natural
law, see, e.g., id. at 138 (Spencer), 168-69 (Locke). Cf.id. at 243 (first article of proposed "Declaration of Rights" providing, in part, "[tihat there are certain natural rights, of which men, when they
form a social compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity").
400. See supra notes 241-53, 281-83, 307-25, 349-54, 367, 390-99 and accompanying texts. Only

Patrick Henry spoke approvingly of judicial review as a means by which state courts could enforce
the constitutional limits imposed upon the federal government. See supra notes 326-27 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 246-50, 336-39, 362-66, 395-96 and accompanying texts.
402. See supra notes 374-78 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 237-38, 280, 298-306, 341-48, 387-89 and accompanying texts.
404. See supra notes 382-83 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 237-38, 387-88 and accompanying texts.
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evidently believed that only state courts should possess the power to review legislation. 40 6 Yet other delegates, like Bowdoin, Parsons, and Thatcher during the
4°7
Massachusetts convention, apparently failed to conceive of judicial review.
CONCLUSION

Contrary to Sherry's reading of the historical record, noninterpretivist judicial review cannot be justified as a constitutionally legitimate practice based on
the founding generation's acceptance of natural-law philosophy. The American
colonists inherited two competing strains of natural-law theory. The first theory
articulated by Coke did provide a framework for judicial enforcement of unwritten individual rights. However, the second theory, advanced by a diverse group
of thinkers that included continental enlightenment philosophers, Locke, Whig
opposition thinkers, the Scottish Common Sense School, and Protestant theologians, did not provide such a framework. Each of the diverse groups espoused a
democratic or egalitarian theory of natural law, which granted to the people the
sole power to make law and categorically denied the judiciary the power to alter
the people's law based on the judges' subjective conceptions of "natural justice."

Cokean natural law theory, furthermore, was not the predominant theory
in revolutionary America. It was the competing democratic theory of natural
law that inspired Thomas Paine's call to arms in Common Sense and Thomas
Jefferson's Declaration of Independence. The newly formed states, moreover,
embraced this competing theory in their first attempts at constitution-making.
Implementing this theory, the early state constitutions endowed the people's
chosen representatives in the legislatures with expansive powers and concomitantly limited the judiciary's powers severely.
Nor, as Sherry asserts, did courts somehow legitimize judicial review in the
few cases in which judges clearly asserted the power to review legislation. To
the contrary, the public responded with outrage and, in one instance, hounded
the judges responsible from office.
Even more importantly, the democratic natural law theory supported the
theory of popular ratification adopted by the men attending the Philadelphia
Convention. This latter theory-by which the Constitution would obtain the
status of binding, paramount law only if adopted by the people-mandates that,
to the extent anyone's "intent" should control constitutional interpretation, the
understanding of the delegates attending the state ratifying conventions who
adopted the Constitution must be accorded great, if not conclusive, weight.
The records of the debates entertained in the state ratifying conventions
demonstrate that noninterpretivist judicial review frustrates the expectations of
the delegates who made the Constitution fundamental law. Indeed, these
records fail to demonstrate unequivocally that the ratifiers understood that the
Constitution authorized even interpretivist judicial review, and fail utterly to
establish any acceptance of noninterpretivist judicial review.
406. See supra text following notes 279-80.

407. See supra notes 255-76 and accompanying text.

